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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1, Is Lola Bartell an "omitted spouse11 under the 
provisions of Title 75-2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
and thereby entitled to set aside the will of her deceased 
husband, Ernest Albin Bartell, and receive her intestate 
share of his estate as his surviving widow? 
In answering this question, there is an even more 
basic issue which must be considered, to-wit: 
2. Did Ernest Albin Bartell provide for his second 
spouse, Lola Bartell, by transfers outside of his will, and 
if so, did he intend that such transfers be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision for her? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal by Lola Bartell from an order of 
the District Court denying her petition wherein she is seeking 
to be declared an "omitted spouse" under the provisions of 
Title 75-2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. 
The will of Ernest Albin Bartell, deceased, was 
filed for probate in the District Court of Weber County, Utah 
and on February 15, 1985, Alma Alkema was appointed as the 
Personal Representative of the estate of said decedent. Lola 
Bartell, widow of said decedent, thereafter filed her petition 
seeking to be declared an omitted spouse, pursuant to Title 75-
1 
2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
3. Disposition in the District Court, 
The Honorable David E. Roth denied the said petition, 
finding that Lola Bartell was not an "omitted spouse?f under 
the Utah statute and ordering that all of said decedent's 
property which was not placed in the name of petitioner by 
decedent during his lifetime, or which he did not place in 
joint tenancy with her, is to be probated under decedent's 
will, dated January 11, 1963. 
4. Statement of Material Facts. 
Following an illness of several weeks, decedent 
Ernest Albin Bartell, died testate on April 28, 1984 at the 
age of 72 years, and at the time of his death he was a 
resident of Weber County, Utah (R. 1). On February 15, 1985, 
Alma Alkema was appointed as the personal representative of 
the estate of said decedent, and decedent's will, dated 
January 11, 1963, was informally probated (R. 15). 
Decedent married his first wife, Cindy, on 
December 2, 1940 and they were married to each other until 
her death of cancer 40 years later on January 17, 1981 (T. 74). 
There were no children born of this marriage (T. 75) and 
each of the parties was employed for at least 30 years of 
the marriage, she as a secretary with the government, and 
he at Utah Power & Light (T. 76 & 77). 
At the time of their marriage, Cindy owned an 
unencumbered home at 2163 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah (T. 75) 
2 
and this home was placed by her in joint tenancy with 
decedent approximately one year after their marriage (T. 186). 
Later in their marriage, decedent and his first wife, 
Cindy, built a home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South Ogden, Utah 
(T. 101). Decedent was his own contractor and did much of 
the work on the home himself, as did his wife, Cindy, who did 
painting, shingling, and "everything she could do physically11 
(T. 38 & 102). Decedent!s brother, Art, spent what was des-
cribed as thousands of hours working on the home and his 
brother-in-law, Ferris Kennedy, spent hundreds of hours work-
ing there (T. 101 & 102). Decedentfs brothers-in-law, Richard 
and Alma Alkema, also worked on the home (T. 102) which was 
described as a "family project" (T. 39). Appellant's State-
ment of Facts that the only persons who helped to build the 
house were Ferris Kennedy, decedent's brother, Art, and 
Cindy, is not correct. 
The South Ogden home was placed in joint tenancy 
by decedent and his first wife, Cindy, and within six 
months after Cindy's death, decedent effected a severance of 
that joint tenancy, and he was the sole owner of said home 
at the time of his death (T. 87). 
Decedent and his first wife had a strong and stable 
marriage relationship and got along very well together. Their 
relationship was described as being close and loving, and they 
were affectionate and devoted marriage partners (T. 63, 70, 78, 
& 112). During their marriage, they acquired together by their 
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joint efforts substantially all of the assets which were owned 
by decedent at the time of his marriage to his second wife, 
Lola (T. 36). They were both very frugal, and Cindy even 
purchased many of her clothes second hand at Deseret Industries 
and then remodeled them herself (T. 77). 
Although decedent and his first wife had no children 
of their own, they had an extremely close relationship with 
decedent's niece, Brenda, whom they treated very much as if 
she were their own daughter (T. 39). BrendaTs mother had died 
when she was five years of age and her father, decedentfs 
brother, Art, was not able to care for her, partially because of 
an alcohol problem (T. 108). Brenda lived with decedent and 
Cindy while she was a student and they were the first parents 
she ever had (T. 110) and were described as "kind of surrogate 
parents" (T. 40). Even after Cindy's death and decedent's 
later marriage to Lola, he continued to treat Brenda like his 
daughter (T. 40), and he treated her children as his own 
grandchildren (T. 40). 
Decedent and his first wife had a close and loving 
relationship with their brothers and sisters (T. 39) and 
he continued to maintain such a relationship with his first 
wife's family after his marriage to Lola (T. 39). 
Decedent married his second wife, Lola, on February 27, 
1982, and was married to her until the time of his death 
on April 28, 1984, a period of two years and two months (T. 9 
& R. 1). At the time of her marriage to decedent, Lola owned 
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an unencumbered home in Bountiful worth $50,000; household 
furniture and furnishings worth approximately $5,000; a 
1975 Mercury automobile worth approximately $1,500; and 
bank accounts worth about $5,000 (T. 23). These assets 
had been accumulated during her 31-year marriage to her 
first husband (T. 23). Lola was employed at the South Davis 
Medical Center earning approximately $1,300 per month at 
the time of her marriage to decedent and had worked for 
approximately 24 years prior thereto (T. 23). After her 
marriage to decedent, she moved into his home in South Ogden 
and rented her Bountiful home which she still owns and from 
which she now receives approximately $450 per month rental 
(T. 24). She has not been employed since this marriage (T. 25). 
Decedent was described by just about everybody as 
an intelligent, alert, and meticulous man who knew what he 
was doing (R. 83, T. 70 & 78). He was a good manager and was 
astute in business matters (T. 37 & 38). During his marriage 
to Lola, he made 11 different transfers to her directly or as 
a joint owner with him of bank accounts totaling $181,597.16 
(R. 53 & 78 & T. 25). On May 18, 1982, he transferred to 
her stock in Utah Power & Light Company having a value on 
that date of $23,658.25 (R. 54, T. 26 & 78). She has 
also received $24,905 as the beneficiary of six life 
insurance policies (R. 45, T. 26 & 78). This amounts to a 
total of $230,160.41 of assets transferred by decedent to 
his second wife during their two-year marriage (T. 27 & 78). 
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When this is added to the value of the assets which Lola 
brought into this marriage, she now has total assets in 
excess of $290,000. 
The assets which were owned by decedent in his own 
name at the time of his death, and which the trial court 
ruled are subject to the terms of his will, consist of the 
home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South Ogden, Utah, worth about 
$100,000, a Utah Power & Light Credit Union Account of 
approximately $12,000, a 1976 Buick automobile, a 1970 
International Travelall, a 1964 Airflow house trailer, and 
household furniture and furnishings (T. 34-36). 
The home which decedent's first wife owned prior 
to their marriage was sold by decedent during his marriage 
to his second wife and she received the sales proceeds of 
$15,000 which are now part of the bank accounts she 
received totaling $181,597.16 (T. 36 & 37). 
The devisees and legatees under decedentfs will 
consist of Jay Wendell Swain, decedent's foster brother, 
and Juanita Eddy Taggart, Cindy's cousin, each of whom were 
given specific bequests of $2,000 and the remainder of 
the estate is to be divided equally between decedent's 
sister, Sylvia Bartell Child, his niece, Brenda Josephine 
Bartell Heslop, his first wife's sister, Florence Marguarite 
Alkema Kennedy, and his first wife's three brothers, Carl 
Henry Alkema, Alma Alkema, and Richard Myron Alkema (R. 6-8). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The applicable statute in this case is Title 75-2-301 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code which reads as follows: 
nOmitted spouse.--(1) If a testator fails 
to provide by will for his surviving spouse 
who married the testator after the execution 
of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive 
the same share of the estate he would have 
received if the decedent left no will unless 
it appears from the will that the omission 
was intentional or the testator provided for 
the spouse by transfer outside the will and " 
the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision is shown by statement's 
of the testator or from the amount of the 
transfer or otKer evidence, (emphasis added) 
(2) In satisfying a share provided by 
this section, the devises made by the will 
abate as provided in section 75-3-902." 
It is evident that Lola meets part of the requirements 
necessary to be declared an "omitted spouse". The will 
executed by decedent in 1963 did not provide for Lola, who 
married decedent many years after the execution of the will 
and, of course, it does not appear from the will that the 
omission was intentional. She fails, however, to qualify as 
an omitted spouse because the decedent provided for her 
outside the will, as evidenced by his having transferred to 
her during their two-year marriage assets consisting of bank 
accounts, corporate stock, and life insurance, having a 
total value of $230,160.41. The statute requires that the 
intent that the transfers outside the will be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision must be shown (1) by statements of 
the testator, or (2) from the amount of the transfer, or (3) 
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from other evidence. 
(1) Decedent made no precise statement that he 
intended the transfers outside the will to be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision, but when the testimony of respondent's 
witnesses is compared to that of appellant's witnesses, it is 
evident that the implications of decedent's statements estab-
lish his intent that the lifetime transfers to his second 
wife were to be in lieu of a testamentary provision. 
(2) The amount of the transfers made by decedent 
to his second wife outside the will ($230,160.41) in and of 
itself show his intent that said transfers were in lieu of a 
testamentary provision. 
(3) "Other evidence11 reinforces the conclusion 
that decedent intended that the lifetime transfers to his 
second wife were in lieu of a testamentary provision. This 
includes the following: 
(a) The transfer of 11 different bank 
accounts from decedent to his second wife 
totaling $181,597.16, together with the trans-
fer of Utah Power & Light Company stock in 
the sum of $23,658, and her being designated 
as the beneficiary of some six life insurance 
policies totaling $24,905 shows a pattern of 
giving which decedent would no doubt have con-
tinued to follow with respect to his remaining 
assets had he intended his second wife to re-
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ceive them. 
(b) Being the meticulous and astute busi-
ness person that he was, and being familiar with 
real estate and joint tenancy concepts as he was, 
it would be expected that he would either transfer 
his remaining property to his second wife or change 
his will had he intended her to receive it. 
(c) Decedent no doubt considered what the 
desires of his first wife would have been regard-
ing the disposition of property she owned prior 
to their marriage and that which she worked 
throughout their marriage to assist in acquiring 
as it relates to whether such property should 
go to dececent's second wife of two years, or 
her own close family members. 
ARGUMENT 
In the case of Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., Utah, 657 P2d 743 (1982), this Court, in 
referring to the decision of the trial court, stated: 
MIt is well established that this Court 
will presume findings of fact to be correct 
and will not overturn them so long as they are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
.... The Court must view the evidence and 
all inferences that might reasonably be made 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the judgment entered. .... Where the evidence 
is in conflict, we defer to the trial court's 
first-hand assessment of the witnesses' cred-
ibility &nd assume that the trial court 
believed those aspects of the evidence which 
support its findings." 
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The findings of the trial court are supported in this 
case by substantial evidence and where there is conflicting 
evidence, the trial court no doubt believed those aspects of 
the evidence which support its findings. 
The applicable statute in this case is Title 75-2-301 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, quoted Supra. As pointed out 
in the case of Estate of Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 655 
P2d 646 (1982) , this statute Mhas never been construed by this 
Court, and has rarely been construed in other jurisdictions'1. 
Although the Christensen case cites the statute, its facts 
are not applicable to this case and no other Utah cases have 
been found construing the statute. 
The referenced Utah statute is the same as the 
Uniform Probate Code §2-301 and 11 ALR 4th 1213 deals with 
this section. After pointing out that an omitted spouse may 
elect to take against the will, it is stated: 
"However, the drafters of the Code also 
recognized that a spouse may provide for 
his spouse's future financial security by 
making various pre-death transfers of his 
real and personal property to his spouse 
and that such transfers might be intended 
to be in lieu of any possible testamentary 
provisions that spouse might make. For 
that reason, the drafters of the Code 
provided in §2-301 that if such a trans-
fer was made by a spouse prior to death 
with the intention to provide for his 
survivor .... the surviving spouse would 
be forbidden to take a statutory share.!! 
The trial court correctly concluded that in the 
present case the basic question is whether decedent intended 
10 
to provide for his second wife by transfers outside the wi 
and that such intent may be shown in one of three ways: 
(1) By statements of the testator. 
(2) From the amount of the transfers. 
(3) From other evidence. 
POINT I 
DECEDENT MADE NO PRECISE STATEMENT THAT HE 
INTENDED THE TRANSFERS OUTSIDE THE WILL TO 
BE IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY PROVISION, BUT 
WHEN THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESSES 
IS COMPARED TO THAT OF APPELLANT'S WITNESSES, 
IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
DECEDENT'S STATEMENTS ESTABLISH HIS INTENT 
THAT THE LIFETIME TRANSFERS TO HIS SECOND 
WIFE WERE TO BE IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY 
PROVISION 
The trial court stated, in paragraph 15 of its 
findings of fa,ct, as follows: 
"15. Decedent did not make any specific 
definite statement to any person as to what his 
intention was. Statements testified to by 
either side pretty much tend to wash each other 
out." (R. 85) 
Appellant's allegations that there was testimony 
from three disinterested persons (Richard Heaton, Doris 
Ashby, and Eldon Ellis) that decedent intended for Lola to 
inherit his house and furniture, is just not true. The 
testimony of Richard Heaton was that when he learned that 
decedent was going to be married, he inquired of him as to 
whether he was going to live in Bountiful or whether they 
would live in Ogden. The response was: 
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MAnd the statement was made by Ernie that 
she had a home in Bountiful, and that they 
would--that he was encouraging her to 
either rent or sell the home, and that she 
was going to come and live with him in 
Ogden in the home there." (T. 54) 
The fact that the parties were going to live in his 
home in Ogden certainly is not an indication that he intended 
to leave the home to her on his death. The conversation took 
place shortly prior to his marriage and had nothing to do with 
contemplation of death. 
When Mr. Heaton was asked on cross-examination if 
decedent ever said that he was going to give his house to her 
for her to own outright, his response was, lfHe never made 
that statement to me11 (T. 57). 
The testimony of Doris Ashby was equally as indefinite 
on this subject. She testified that in a conversation with 
decedent shortly before his marriage to Lola, she asked, refer-
ring to Lola, nrWhatfs she going to do with her house?' And 
he says, TWell, I told her she could either rent it or sell 
it, she wouldn't need it, she would have mine. ,ff 
Again, this discussion took place prior to the 
marriage and in no way was in anticipation of decedent's death. 
It was obvious that he intended she would have the use of his 
home and that they would be living there together. He prob-
ably anticipated at the time of the conversation that he 
would later transfer substantial assets to her, which he did 
to the extent of over $230,000. When asked specifically on 
12 
cross-examination whether decedent ever told Mrs. Ashby that 
"on his death he was going to give her his house" she re-
sponded, nNo, the subject never came up anymore.M (T. 65) 
The testimony of Eldon Ellis of a conversation he 
claims to have had with decedent on March 16, 1982 , wherein 
decedent stated, "'No,1 he says, 'if anything happens to me, 
Lola gets the house. And she won't have to worry about 
money.IM is not persuasive. That conversation took place 
seventeen days after decedent's remarriage. As Mr. Ellis 
indicated, decedent was Mjust almost honeymooning stillM 
and was not talking about death or any anticipation of his 
dying (T. 72). Should it be determined that he at that time 
intended that Lola would have the house upon his death, he 
obviously changed his mind later on when he made the 11 
transfers of bank accounts to her, together with the trans-
fers of the stock and life insurance. The critical consider-
ation is not what decedent's intent was prior to, or early 
in his second marriage when these conversations were had, but 
rather at the time he later made the transfers outside the 
will. 
Ferris Kennedy testified of a conversation he had 
some six or eight months after the parties were married. At 
that time, decedent had become "a little peeved" at the 
amount of time that Lola was spending away from home in 
Bountiful, and in response to a question by Mr. Kennedy as 
to whether the parties were going to continue to live in the 
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house in Ogden or were going to move to Bountiful to be 
closer to Lola's family and her exercise class, decedent 
responded: "'Oh,' he says, !thatfs her home and I have my 
home'." (T. 104) 
Decedent's further intention that Lola not have his 
home is evidenced by a conversation which decedent had with 
Ferris Kennedy approximately a year after the parties were 
married and at a time when decedent was apparently not quite 
so sure about the stability of his second marriage. Mr. 
Kennedy asked the question, "Well, are you still going to 
maintain the home in Bountiful as well as the one in Ogden?", 
to which decedent replied, "Oh, yeah, just in case this thing 
doesn't work out we will both have a place to go." (T. 105) 
These conversations, of course, took place sometime after the 
honeymoon was over. 
During all of these conversations, it is evident 
that decedent was conscious of the fact that he had executed 
a will many years earlier providing for his niece, Brenda 
and other close relatives. During a conversation with Brenda 
shortly before his marriage in which they were discussing 
the problems of second marriages, Brenda said, "'Uncle Ern, 
you know, there are many stories that I have heard with 
second marriages and financial conditions that unless there 
are specific things stated that there can be lots of 
problems.' And I just said, 'You know', I told him about 
an example. And he said--he just laughed it off 'don't bring 
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that up, I have got the will1.11 
It is evident from this conversation that decedent 
remembered and relied upon the will he had prepared years 
earlier. 
It is clear from all of the foregoing testimony, 
decedent, by his statements, does not indicate an intention 
that his home should be given to Lola upon his death. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DECEDENT 
PROVIDED FOR HIS SECOND WIFE BY TRANSFERS 
OUTSIDE THE WILL AND HIS INTENT TO DO SO IS 
EVIDENCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE TRANSFERS 
The trial court, in paragraph 16 of its findings o 
fact, stated: 
!f16. The large amount of assets transferred 
by decedent to his second wife suggest there was 
an intent for him to provide for her outside of 
the will and this is significant.11 (R. 85-86) 
Prior to her marriage to decedent, Lola had lived 
under rather modest circumstances. After 31 years of marria 
she and her first husband had accumulated assets, including 
their home, of a value of approximately $60,000, or approx-
imately $2,000 for each of the years they were married to 
each other. 
During her two-year marriage to decedent, he 
transferred assets to her in excess of $230,000, or almost 
four times as much as she and her first husband had accumu-
lated in 31 years. Decedent no doubt recognized that should 
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he predecease Lola, she would still have her home in Bountiful 
and could put the $230,000 she received from him into an 
investment, which at 10 per cent interest would produce in 
excess of $1,900 per month income to her, without invading 
any of the principal investment. This is almost one and a 
half times as much as the $1,300 per month she was earning 
at the time of her marriage to decedent. Lola testified 
that were she living in her Bountiful home, which she still 
owns, her living expenses would be about $1,000 a month (T. 33 
& 34) and, of course, she would be very comfortable living 
merely on the interest from the money received from decedent. 
Although there are no Utah cases on this subject, 
and few in other jurisdictions, one case that is particularly 
significant is Matter of Estate of Taggart, New Mexico, 619 
P2d 562, 11 ALR 4th 1201 (1980). In that case, the testator 
executed a will leaving his entire estate to his deceased 
wife's mother, and should she predecease the testator the 
estate was to be divided between three individuals who were 
friends or distant relatives of the deceased. Subsequent to 
the execution of the will, he married Margie who was not 
provided for in the previously executed will. After the 
testator's death, Margie claimed she was an omitted spouse 
under a New Mexico statute identical to that in Utah. A 
jury found that decedent had provided for his second wife by 
three transfers outside the will and that by virtue of the 
size of the transfers, they were intended to be lieu of 
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testamentary provisions for Margie. The three transfers 
consisted of: (1) designating her as a joint tenant on a 
checking account in the sum of $2,889.87; (2) designating 
her as a joint tenant on a savings account with a balance of 
$15,908.00; and (3) making an election under his retire-
ment plan providing her with benefits amounting to $410.00 
per month. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the jury and noted that three factors were 
significant in determining the decedent's intent. These 
were (1) the period of time the couple had been married, 
(2) the amount transferred to the second wife, and (3) the 
portion of the total estate to others. 
(1) The New Mexico Court felt it was important that 
the parties had been married for less than two years. This is 
comparable to the two years two months that the appellant and 
decedent were married to each other in the present case. 
(2) The amount of the transfers in the New Mexico 
case are only a fraction of the transfers of $230,000.00 made 
in the present case. Yet, the New Mexico Court felt they were 
sufficiently large to constitute evidence of decedent's intent. 
(3) The evidence in the New Mexico case was that 
the transfers to Margie outside the will represented 20 per 
cent of the total estate. In the present case, the amount 
of transfers by decedent to Lola amounted to approximately 
two-thirds of the total estate. 
Under the circumstances, the decision of the trial 
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court in this case is considerably more compelling than that 
of the New Mexico case. 
Another case of significance is Matter of Estate 
of Knudsen, North Dakota, 342 N.W.2d 387 (1984). In that 
case, decedent, in 1962, executed a will leaving his entire 
estate to his first wife. Thirteen years later, he divorced 
her and married his second wife, who, of course, was not 
named in the will. Four years later, he died and his second 
wife sought to be declared an omitted spouse under a statute 
identical to that in Utah. There was evidence that decedent 
transferred assets into joint tenancy with himself and his 
second wife, and that he also named her the beneficiary of 
several life insurance policies, with the total of the 
joint tenancy property and life insurance proceeds being 
equivalent to just over one-third of his total estate. His 
second wife contended that neither the transfers to the 
joint tenancy nor the naming her as beneficiary on his 
insurance policies constituted a "transfer" to her. The 
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial 
court to the effect that these were, in fact, "transfers" 
within the meaning of the Uniform Probate Code and held that 
a trier of fact may determine from the amount of the trans-
fer alone whether or not the deceased intended that the 
transfers to a spouse outside of the will be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision. The Court then ruled that the said 
transfers of approximately one-third of the total estate 
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were of a sufficient amount to show decedent's intent that 
the transfers were in lieu of a testamentary provision. 
Another important North Dakota case was decided 
shortly thereafter. In Matter of Estate of Frandson, North 
Dakota, 356 N.W.2d 125 (1984), it was determined that a 
husband was not an omitted spouse under the North Dakota 
statute where his second wife died approximately three years 
after their marriage, leaving a will executed three years 
prior to their marriage, which obviously did not contain a 
provision for the husband. During their marriage, the second 
wife had transferred into joint tenancy with her husband 
property worth approximately $81,000. On the date of 
her death, the value of her solely owned property was more 
than $94,000. The Court considered that the parties 
were married for a relatively short period of time and that 
the evidence reflected that the decedent during her marriage 
consciously retained certain assets in her own name. The 
Court then stated, at page 127: 
"Louis received from Elsie a substantial 
portion of her estate by her placement of 
property into joint tenancy. Of the $136,000 
value of the property held in joint tenancy, 
Elsie contributed $81,000. Elsie's contri-
bution to the joint tenancy property was 
almost as much as the amount she retained 
for disposition by will. Having carefully 
reviewed the record, we cannot say the trial 
court's finding that Elsie provided for 
Louis by transfers outside the will with 
the intent that the transfers be in lieu of 
a testamentary provision is clearly erron-
eous ." 
19 
It should be remembered that in the present case, 
Lola contributed nothing whatsoever to the joint tenancy 
property and that it all came from the efforts of decedent 
and his first wife, Cindy. 
If the present case, where the "omitted spouse11 
received over $230,000 during a two-year marriage, does not 
meet the "amount of the transfers" requirement of the statute, 
it is difficult to conceive that any case would ever meet such 
requirement. 
POINT III 
"OTHER EVIDENCE" WAS CORRECTLY FOUND BY THE 
TRIAL COURT TO ESTABLISH DECEDENT'S INTENT 
THAT THE TRANSFERS HE MADE OUTSIDE THE WILL 
WERE TO BE IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY PROVISION 
The trial court made the following finding in this 
regard: 
"17. Decedent is described by just about 
everybody as a man who knew what he was doing. 
He was intelligent, alert, and meticulous. 
Because of this, and because he did evidence 
a pattern of giving to his second wife and 
transferring properties to her, it is the 
impression of the Court that had he wanted to 
transfer the house to her, he would have done 
it. Had he wanted her to have everything, he 
would have changed his Will. He didn't die 
a suddent death. He was ill a period of time 
and he knew he was ill. At that time, if he 
wanted to clear up any affairs that he thought 
were loose ends he could have done it and at 
that time, if he had intended to transfer the 
house, that would have been the time to do it. 
This is evidence that he intended the house 
to pass by his previous Will, 
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18. The Court believes that the house 
in South Ogden may have been a sentimental 
item to decedent that he thought had 
connections with his previous family and he 
thought they should dispose of it and dispose 
of the proceeds of the sale, because they all 
helped build it." (R. 85-86) 
In addition to decedent being an intelligent, alert, 
and meticulous man who knew the nature and extent of his 
property and who was a good manager, he was well acquainted 
with the procedure for transferring real estate and the 
implications of joint tenancy. He knew that the severance 
of joint tenancy in real estate required the filing of an 
affidavit and death certificate with the county recorder's 
office, as he has previously done this with respect to both 
the Grant Avenue and South Ogden properties (T. 86-87). Had 
he intended that Lola should have his South Ogden home, he 
surely would have gone through the relatively simple proced-
ure, with which he was acquainted, of having the property 
placed in her name, particularly considering his deliberate 
actions in making 11 different conveyances of bank accounts 
to her* It is significant, however, that he did not do 
this. He had obviously given consideration to the ownership 
of the South Ogden home, however, inasmuch as he severed the 
joint tenancy in that property while he was dating Lola. As 
previously indicated, about this time, he took consolation 
in the fact that he had a will which he discussed with his 
niece, Brenda, during the time he was dating Lola. Being 
the astute and meticulous person he was, he would surely 
21 
have changed the will had he intended that it no longer be 
in effect. 
Considering decedent's loving and close relationship 
with his first wife, he also no doubt considered what would 
be fair and equitable from her standpoint. He was aware of 
the great love and affection she had for her brothers and 
sister, which was a relationship he also shared and fostered 
even after Cindy's death and his marriage to Lola. He no 
doubt considered how Cindy would have felt about everything 
she had worked for 30 years to acquire, including the home 
she had owned outright before her marriage to Ernie, going 
to Lola after a two-year marriage to Ernie, to the exclusion 
of her own family members. 
He must also have given thought to his niece, 
Brenda, and their almost parent-child relationship. 
In anticipating that the home would go under the 
provisions of the will, he obviously remembered those who 
had helped in the construction of the home, including Cindy, 
his brother, Art, and his brothers-in-law, Ferris, Richard, 
and Alma. The trial judge correctly observed that this home, 
the construction of which had been a "family project" was 
no doubt intentionally left to those family members who were 
so closely involved in its construction and to the loved ones 
of those now deceased. 
Any self-serving testimony given by Lola claiming 
that decedent, by implication, intended her to have his 
22 
South Ogden home is clearly rebutted by the actual conduct 
of decedent. 
The evidence indicates that Lola knew at the time 
of decedent's death that it was never intended that she have 
the home. This is evident from the conversation she had with 
Brenda Heslop and Florence Kennedy on August 20, 1984 when 
she talked about her claim to the home. Florence recalls the 
statement of Lola, as follows: 
"She said she had everything, and if she 
lived longer with Ernie, she would have gotten 
the house, too." (T. 89) 
Brenda recalls the conversation as: 
ITShe said, 'Well, it is just too bad 
he didn't live longer because I would have 
got the house toof." (T. 121) 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court denying the petition 
of Lola Bartell seeking to be declared an "omitted spouse" 
should be affirmed and all of the assets which were owned 
by decedent in his own right at the time of his death should 
be probated under his will dated January 11, 1963. 
Respectfully submitted this 
22nd day of November, 1985. 
7*7 C. Gerald Barker 
C. Gerald Parker 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of November, 
1985, I hand delivered 10 copies of the Respondent's brief 
to the Utah Supreme Court Clerk and four copies to George K. 
Fadel, Attorney for Appellant, at 170 West Fourth South, 
Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
7$7 C Gerald Earfer 
C. Gerald Parker 
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Exhibit C: 75-2-301, Utah Uniform Probate Code 
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C. Gerald Parker 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
P. 0. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
ERNEST ALBIN BARTELL, a/k/a 
ERNEST A. BARTELL, a/k/a 
EARNEST A. BARTELL, 
Deceased. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Probate No. 15771 
The petition of LOLA BARTELL, pursuant to which she 
is seeking to be declared an "omitted spouse" under Title 75-2-301 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, came on regularly for hearing 
on the 31st day of May, 1985, before the Honorable David E. Roth, 
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting without a 
jury. The petitioner, LOLA BARTELL, appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, GEORGE K. FADEL. ALMA ALKEMA, the 
Personal Representative of decedent's estate, appeared in person 
and was represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker. The Court 
heard evidence introduced on behalf of both the petitioner and 
the %a£H Personal Representative, and after being fully advised 
/ ;,A EXHIRIT A n A 
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in the premises, now makes the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That decedent, ERNEST ALBIN BARTELL, died testate 
on April 28, 1934, at the age of 72 years, and at the time of 
his death, he was a resident of Weber County, Utah. 
2. That on February 15, 1985", ALMA ALKEMA was appointed 
as the Personal Representative of the estate of said decedent, 
and decedent's Will, dated January 11, 1963 was informally 
probated. 
3. That decedent married his first wife, CINDY, on 
December 2, 1940. They were married to each other until CINDY'S 
death of cancer 40 years later on January 17, 1981. There were 
no children born of this marriage and each of the parties was 
employed during substantially all of the marriage, he at Utah 
Power & Light Company and she at Defense Depot Ogden. 
4. That at the time of their marriage, CINDY owned 
a home which was paid for at 2163 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah. 
During the marriage, this home was placed in joint tenancy with 
CINDY and the decedent. 
5. During their marriage, decedent and his first wife, 
CINDY, built a home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South Ogden, Utah. 
Members of decedent's family, including his brother, and members 
of CINDY'S family, including her brothers and brothers-in-law, 
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spent many hours working together with CINDY and decedent in 
building said home. 
6. The said South Ogden home was acquired in joint 
tenancy by decedent and his first spouse, CINDY, and after CINDY'S 
death, decedent effected a severance of that joint tenancy and 
at the time of decedent's death, he was the sole owner of said 
home. 
7. That during the marriage of decedent and his first 
wife, CINDY, they acquired together substantially all of the 
assets which were owned by decedent at the time of his marriage 
to LOLA BARTELL, on February 27, 1982. 
8. That decedent was married to LOLA BARTELL for two 
years and two months, until his death on April 28, 1984. Said 
decedent did not die a sudden death but was ill for the last 
several weeks of his life, 
9. Decedent was an intelligent, alert, and meticulous 
man who was described by just about everybody as a man who knew 
what he was doing. He evidenced a pattern of giving to his 
second wife, LOLA, and during their marriage, he transferred to 
her some 11 bank accounts totaling approximately $181,597.16. 
He also transferred to her during their marriage stock in Utah 
Power & Light Company in the sum of $23,658.25. At the time 
of his death, he left life insurance proceeds to her in the sum 
of $24,905.00. All together, he left her a total of $230,160.41. 
t \ < \ -3-
0 
E c 
J < 
l \ g 
o £ * 
0 m o CD 
-
 z
 x 5 
i o ° D 
E | o £ 
"} * «• w 
c 2 Q 
" £ O 
s • 
c 
t 
L 
$> 138 
L H *J£33 
lndti*d . . 
10. That at the time of her marriage to decedent, LOLA 
BARTELL, owned a home at Bountiful, Utah which she states was 
worth approximately $50,000.00, furniture, a 1975 Mercury 
automobile, and accounts totaling about $5,000.00. She was, at 
that time, employed at the South Davis Medical Center earning 
approximately $1,300.00 per month. 
11. During the marriage of decedent and LOLA BARTELL, 
they resided in his home in South Ogden and LOLA BARTELL was not 
employed during their marriage. 
12. The assets which were owned by decedent in his 
own name, at the time of his death, and which are subject to the 
terms of his Will, are the home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South 
Ogden, Utah, a Utah Power & Light Credit Union account of 
approximately $12,000.00, a 1976 Buick automobile, a 1970 
International Travelall, a 1964 Airflow house trailer, and 
household furniture and furnishings. 
13. That the devisees and legatees under decedent's 
Will consist of JAY WENDELL SWAIN, decedentfs foster brother, 
and JUANITA EDDY TAGGART, CINDY'S cousin, each of whom were 
given specific bequests of $2,000.00 each, and the remainder 
of the estate is to be divided in equal shares between decedentfs 
sister, SYLVIA BARTELL CHILD, his niece, BRENDA JOSEPHINE BARTELL 
HESLOP, his first wife's sister, FLORENCE MARGUARITE ALKEMA KENNEDY 
and^hls first wife's three brothers, CARL HENRY ALKEMA, ALMA ALKEMA 
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and RICHARD MYRON ALKEMA. 
14. That the applicable statute in this case is 
Title 75-2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code which is intended 
to protect an overlooked spouse. The basic question is whether 
this spouse (decedent's second wife) was overlooked by her 
husband and whether decedent intended that the Will operate to 
the extent that it could and whether he intended to provide for 
her separately. The statute suggests that the Court look at 
three things to determine what decedent's intention was. First, 
any statements that decedent made. The next is the amount of 
the transfers decedent made to his second wife outside of the 
Will, and the third is other evidence. 
15. Decedent did not make any specific definite statement 
to any person as to what his intention was. Statements testified 
to by either side pretty much tend to wash each other out. 
16. The large amount of assets transferred by decedent 
to his second wife suggest there was an intent for him to provide 
for her outside of the Will and this is significant. 
17. Decedent is described by just about everybody as 
a men who knew what he was doing. He was intelligent, alert, and 
meticulous. Because of this, and because he did evidence a pattern 
of giving to his second wife and transferring properties to her, 
it is the impression of the Court that had he wanted to transfer 
the house to her. he would have done it. Had he wanted her to 
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have everything, he would have changed his Will. He didn't die 
a sudden death. He was ill a period of time and he knew he was 
ill. At that time, if he wanted to clear up any affairs that he 
thought were loose ends he could have done it and at that time, 
if he had intended to transfer the house, that would have been 
the time to do it. This is evidence that he intended the house 
to pass by his previous Will. 
18. The Court believes that the house in South Ogden 
may have been a sentimental item to decedent that he thought had 
connections with his previous family and he thought they should 
dispose of it and dispose of the proceeds of the sale, because 
they all helped build it. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court arrives 
at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That decedent intended to provide for his second 
spouse, LOLA BARTELL, outside of the Will. He did this by 
transferring assets to her in the sum of $230,160.41. She is 
well provided for. The property that was not placed in her 
name or in joint tenancy will be probated under decedent's 
Will dated in 1963. 
DATED this ^/ day of \W/^^} " * \ ,*- 1985, y  
District Judge ^  
B.W^S^. JL o o 
fodtitd 
Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Probate No. 15771 
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George K. Fa~del 
Attorney for Petitioner, 
Lola S. Bartell 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to George K. Fadel, 
Attorney for Petitioner Lola Bartell, at 170 West Fourth South, 
Bountiful, Utah 84010, this / # day of June, 1985. 
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C. Gerald Parker 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
P. 0. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
ERNEST ALBIN BARTELL, a/k/a 
ERNEST A. BARTELL, a/k/a 
EARNEST A. BARTELL, 
Deceased. 
ORDER 
Probate No. 15771 
The petition of LOLA BARTELL, pursuant to which she 
is seeking to be declared an "omitted spouse" under Title 75-2-301 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, came on regularly for hearing 
on the 31st day of May, 1985, before the Honorable David E. Roth, 
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting without a 
jury. The petitioner, LOLA BARTELL, appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, GEORGE K. FADEL. ALMA ALKEMA, the 
Personal Representative of decedent's estate, appeared in person 
and was represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker. The Court 
heard evidence introduced on behalf of both the petitioner and 
the.jsaid Personal Representative, and being fully advised in the 
• '-'ft fl
 s EXHIBIT B 
o 
T ° 
o < 
h > 
~ Ul N X j o 
D D . * 
o £ « 
>- z x 5 
d o • 3 
hoz-
r 2 "• Q 
E <
 0 
" J O 
£ o 
i« 
X 
L 
premises, said Court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, pursuant to which an Order is to be entered; now by virtue 
of the law and premises, in accordance with the facts found and 
conclusions of law aforesaid, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Petition of LOLA BARTELL seeking to be 
declared an "omitted spouse11 under Title 75-2-301 of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, is hereby denied, and the property which 
was not placed in the name of said petitioner by decedent during 
his lifetime, or which he did not place in joint tenancy with her, 
is hereby ordered to be probated under decedent's Will dated 
January 11, 1963. 
DATED this 1585/ 
Judge 
APPROVEP AS TO FORM: 
George "K. ^Fadel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Lola Bartell 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Order to George K. Fadel, Attorney for Petitioner Lola Bartell, at 
170 West Fourth South, Bountiful, Utah 84010, this / ? day of 
# * l e , 1985. 
it/iss/ ^££* ?l&~ 
75-2-206 INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS 
and equitable as long as it was before of deceased was not binding on grantees 
distribution of tbe estate. In re Thur- of decedent in action by widow to estab-
man's Estate, 13 U. (2d) 156, 369 P. 2d lish dower in land conveyed to grantees, 
925. and judgment was not admissible to 
m prove her marriage. Hilton v. Snyder, 
Prior judgment not proof of marriage, 37 u. 384, 108 P. 698, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 
Judgment, in action against estate, de- 241. 
claring one claiming dower to be widow 
75-2-206. Effect of election on benefits by will or statute.—A surviv-
ing spouse is entitled to homestead allowance, exempt property, and 
family allowance, whether or not he elects to take an elective share. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-206, enacted of benefits under the will (in the absence 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §3. of renunciation) because those benefits 
are charged against the elective share 
Editorial Board Comment under sections 75-2-201, 75-2-202 and 
The election does not result in a loss 75-2-207(1). 
75-2-207. Charging spouse with gifts received—Liability of others 
for balance of elective share.—(1) In the proceeding for an elective 
share, values included in the augmented estate which pass or have passed 
to the surviving spouse, or which wrould have passed to the surviving 
spouse but were renounced, are applied first to satisfy the elective share 
and to reduce any contributions due from other recipients of transfers 
included in the augmented estate. 
(2) Remaining property of the augmented estate is so applied that 
liability for the balance of the elective share of the surviving spouse is 
equitably apportioned among the recipients of the augmented estate in 
proportion to the value of their interests therein. 
(3) Only original transferees from, or appointees of, the decedent 
and their donees, to the extent the donees have the property or its 
proceeds, are subject to the contribution to make up the elective share 
of the surviving spouse. A person liable to contribution may choose to 
give up the property transferred to him or to pay its value as of the 
time it is considered in computing the augmented estate. 
History: C 1953, 75-2-207, enacted Editorial Board Comment 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3; L. 1977, ch. 194, Sections 75-2-401, 75-2-402 and 75-2-
§ "• 403 have the effect of giving a spouse 
Compiler's Notes certain exempt property and allowances 
rm_ ../*rr„ * J x * x*. x , «_ *n addition to the amount of the elective 
The 1977 amendment substituted "re- share, 
cipients of transfers" near the end of 
subsec. (1) for "recipients or transfers." 
Part 3 
Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Wills 
75-2-301. Omitted spouse.—(1) If a testator fails to provide by will 
for his surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution 
of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the estate 
he would have received if the decedent left no will unless it appears from 
the will that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for 
52 
EXHIBIT C 
SPOUSE AND CHILDREN 75-2-302 
the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer 
be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the 
testator or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence, 
(2) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made 
by the will abate as provided in section 75-3-9 02. 
History: C 1953, 75-2-301, enacted effect of this section should be to re-
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3. duce the number of instances where a 
T3J-* • t » J r* * spouse will claim an elective share. 
Editorial Board Comment. 
Section 75-2-508 provides that a will is Collateral References. 
not revoked by a change of circumstances Descent and Distribution<S=>52. 
occurring subsequent to its execution 26A CJ.S. Descent and Distribution 
other than as described by that section. § 49. 
This section reflects the view that the 23 Am. Jur. 2d 851, Descent and Dis-
intestate share of the spouse is what the tribution § 108. 
decedent would want the spouse to have Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic 
if he had thought about the relationship Service, Uniform Probate Code. 
of his old will to the new situation. The 
75-2-302. Pretermitted children.—(1) If a testator fails to provide 
in his will for any of his children or issue of a deceased child, the 
omitted child or issue receives a share in the estate equal in value to 
that which he would have received if the testator had died intestate 
unless: 
(a) It appears from the will that the omission was intentional; 
(b) When the will was executed the testator had one or more 
children and devised substantially all his estate to or for the exclushv. 
benefit of the other parent of the omitted child, or of the deceased child 
whose issue are omitted; or 
(c) The testator provided for the child or issue by transfer outside 
the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary 
provision is shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of 
the transfer or other evidence. 
(2) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to 
provide in his will for a living child solely because he believes the 
child to be dead, the child receives a share in the estate equal in value 
to that which he would have received if the testator had died intestate. 
(3) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made 
by the will abate as provided in section 75-3-902. 
(4) If the issue of a deceased child takes the share of the deceased 
child under section 75-2-605, the issue shall not be considered pre-
termitted and shall not receive a share of the estate under this section. 
(5) If it appears from the will that the omission of a child of the 
testator was intentional and if no express provision is made in the 
will for the issue of the child, the testator will be considered to have 
intended to also omit the issue. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-302, enacted by the exclusive benefit of" and "whose 
L 1975, ch. 150, § 3; L. 1977, ch. 194, § 9. issue are omitted" in subd. (1) (b); and 
„ ., . _ added subsecs. (4) and (5). 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amendment inserted "or for 
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HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES v. UNIONAMERICA, INC, 
Ote as, Utah, 657 P-2d 743 
itoewhat lower than those of other ap-
praisers and therefore could have been used 
1
 Tdiow that the value of the land plaintiffs 
ated was even less in relationship to the 
tie of all the land, thus making their plan 
Ippear more equitable. The court sus-
tained defendants' objection to his testimo-
ny, apparently on the grounds that he had 
(jeen one of the initial referees in the parti-
i suit and prior to that had been a conf i-
atial adviser to one of defendants' attor-
1We pass over the potential attorney-
at privilege problems that might have 
had Kiepe testified because we are 
Utah 743 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corporation, 
aka Westmor; Ramshire, Inc., a corpo-
ration; William R. Stevenson; Park 
City Reservations, a corporation, dba 
Skyline Realty; Harry F. Reed; and 
Gary Cole, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 17359. 
Satisfied that even if the exclusion were 
grroneous, the decree still could not be re-
fersei The exclusion of evidence is harm-
esa, "unless . . . the excluded evidence 
tfould probably have had a substantial in-
fluence in bringing about a different ver-
or finding." Utah REvid. 5. We do 
believe Kiepe's testimony would have 
1 that effect. Plaintiffs called three oth-
jjtwitnesses who testified on the property 
ilues; one more would not have substan-
tially affected the outcome. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the trial court's findings of fact 
ire supported by substantial evidence and 
there is no basis in law for reversing the 
decree of partition except for the manner in 
which the sale of the Old Ranch property is 
to be conducted. Accordingly, the trial 
court's judgment and decree of partition is 
*n all respects affirmed, except with respect 
to the manner of selling the Old Ranch 
property. We reverse and remand so that 
the trial court may modify the order of sale 
to
 provide for the sale of the Old Ranch 
P^perty in a manner consistent with this 
"pinion. Costs to respondents. 
OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ, and 
HOMER F. WILKINSON, District Judge, 
concur. 
HALL C.J.. does not participate herein. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 14, 1982. 
Listing broker brought action against 
vendor and selling broker for alleged breach 
of a fee splitting arrangement. The Third 
District Court, Summit County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., determined that listing broker 
was entitled to a commission, but awarded 
60% of that commission to selling broker, 
and listing broker appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) selling 
broker fully performed obligations required 
of it under the fee splitting arrangement 
between parties and, as a procuring cause 
of the sale, was entitled to 60% of the 
commission; (2) vendor had no duty to re-
fer all "walk-in" inquiries to listing broker 
and, hence, selling broker could not have 
breached any duty by its failure to inform 
listing broker that a "walk-in" buyer had 
been referred from vendor; (3) denial of 
punitive damages was not error in absence 
of evidence of constructive fraud, conspir-
acy, conversion or intentional infliction of 
mental distress; and (4) attorney fees were 
not recoverable when listing broker rested 
its case without presenting or proffering 
evidence on issue. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error e=>931(l), 1010.1(6) 
The Supreme Court must presume that 
a trial court's findings of fact are correct 
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and, if they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record, will not overturn 
them and must view the evidence and all 
inferences that might reasonably be made 
from the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the judgment entered. 
2. Brokers <&=>66 
Finding that selling broker fully per-
formed the obligations required of it under 
a fee splitting agreement with the listing 
broker and, hence, was entitled to 60% of 
the commission as the procuring cause of 
the sale of real estate in question was sup-
ported by substantial evidence in record. 
3. Pretrial Procedure <s=»434 
Local rule requiring that all documents 
be filed with court 30 days prior to com-
mencement of trial did not justify delay 
until last day of trial in introducing docu-
ment allegedly evidencing defendant real 
estate broker's lack of capacity, where doc-
ument was available ten days before trial, 
as rule specified that nothing therein should 
preclude or limit voluntary exchange of in-
formation or discovery, with result that rule 
had no application. 
4. Pretrial Procedure <&=>751 
Failure of listing broker to take advan-
tage of opportunity afforded under rules of 
giving notice before trial of its defense 
against selling broker of lack of capacity 
was to be taken as a waiver of that defense. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 9(a)(1), 15(a). 
5. Parties <&=»76(1) 
If the party against whom the defense 
of lack of capacity is asserted has notice 
and an opportunity to respond, the issue 
need not be raised specifically in the plead-
ings, but the notice must be definite and 
clear. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 9(aXl). 
6. Parties <8=>76(1) 
Pleading illegality and lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction do not put a party on 
notice to respond to a defense of lack of 
capacity. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 9(aXl). 
7. Brokers <&=>11, 19 
A real estate broker is an agent of the 
property owner for whom he acts and, as 
such, owes a fiduciary duty to the principal 
but aside from the principal's duty to act in 
good faith in the execution of the brokerage 
contract, there is no reciprocal fiduciary 
duty running from the principal to the bro-
ker. 
8. Fraud <&=»7 
A fiduciary or confidential relationship 
may be created by contract or by circum-
stances where equity will imply a higher 
duty in a relationship because the trusting 
party has been induced to relax the cars 
and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise. 
9. Fraud e=>7 
For a fiduciary or confidential relation, 
ship to arise, the evidence must demon-
strate the placement of trust and reliance 
such that the nature of the relationship is 
clear. 
10. Compromise and Settlement <s=>15(l) 
No extraordinary duty ran from vendor 
to listing broker beyond ordinary duty of 
good faith in performance of contracts, not* 
withstanding language of settlement agree-
ment between parties, where settlement 
agreement resulted from a previous suit 
brought by broker against vendor for al-
leged breach of contract and tortious con-
duct and, as such, placed parties in adver-
sarial postures which did not suggest confi-
dence or trust. 
11. Contracts <s=> 143.5 
When a question arises regarding a 
written document, the first source of in-
quiry must be the document itself, con-
sidered in its entirety. 
12. Contracts <&=>1 
Persons dealing at arm's length are 
entitled to contract on their own terms 
without intervention of courts to relieve 
either party from effects of a bad bargain 
13. Contracts <&=>143(3) 
A court will not rewrite a contract to 
supply terms which the parties omitted 
14. Brokers <&=>11 
Exclusive listing agreement between 
vendor and listing broker could not be con-3 
strued as requiring vendor to refer aB 
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"walk-in" buyers to listing broker inasmuch 
$s agreement contemplated the split of 
commissions between listing and selling 
brokers, and, hence, did not make listing 
broker the sole and exclusive agent for the 
jrendor. 
15. Appeal and Error <s=»931(l), 1011.1(6) 
Where the evidence is in conflict, the 
Supreme Court must defer to the trial 
court's firsthand assessment of the witness-
es' credibility and assume that the trial 
court believed those aspects of the evidence 
which support its findings. 
16. Brokers <s=>66 
Selling broker did not breach any duty 
"under its fee splitting agreement with list-
ing broker by its failure to inform latter 
that a "walk-in" buyer had been referred 
from vendor and, hence, was not liable to 
fisting broker for compensatory damages 
since, regardless of characterization given 
to relationship between brokers, vendor had 
no duty to refer "walk-in" inquiries to list-
ing broker. 
17. Damages <s=>89(2) 
A breach of contract, standing alone, 
does not call for punitive damages, even if 
intentional and unjustified, but if there is 
8ome independent tort indicating malice, 
fraud or wanton disregard for rights of 
others, such damages are allowable. 
18. Damages <s=»89(2) 
Refusal to award punitive damages in 
broker's action against vendor and 
selling broker was not error since there was 
Bo evidence of a breach of a fiduciary duty 
<* a duty to act in good faith and no 
evidence of constructive fraud, conspiracy, 
conversion or intentional infliction of men-
tal distress. 
19. Costs <s=*207 
Failure to award listing broker an at-
torney's fee for its recovery against vendor 
and selling broker of a partial commission 
under a fee splitting arrangement was not 
***OT where listing broker rested its case 
Without presenting or proffering evidence 
*>n issue and neither sought nor obtained 
leave of court to reopen its case at a later 
time for that purpose. 
Kent B. Linebaugh, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
James A. Boevers, F.S. Prince, Jr., Ste-
phen G. Crockett, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This case is an appeal by the plaintiff/ap-
pellant from a judgment by the Third Dis-
trict Court for Summit County following a 
trial to the court The district court award-
ed to the plaintiff, Hal Taylor Associates 
(HTA), a real estate listing broker's com-
mission of 6% on the sale of defendant 
Unionamerica's real property at the price of 
$1.6 million, and awarded 60% of that com-
mission to defendant Park City Reserva-
tions (PCR) as the selling brokers in the 
transaction. 
In 1977, HTA and Unionamerica settled a 
previous dispute with a Settlement Agree-
ment dated February 17, 1977. This agree-
ment specified that for the following five 
years, Unionamerica would enter into "ex-
clusive listing agreements" with HTA for 
the sale of its Summit County properties, 
that HTA would perform the "usual real 
estate broker activities," and that HTA 
would receive a commission of 6%. The 
agreement then stated that: "Taylor will 
further agree to a fee-splitting arrange-
ment giving 60% to the selling broker and 
40% to the listing broker." The Agreement 
was signed by William R. Stevenson for 
Unionamerica and by Hal Taylor for HTA. 
Within hours, Unionamerica and HTA en-
tered into a listing agreement for a 10.5 
acre piece of property known as the "Vil-
lage Land" in Park City. This form agree-
ment made HTA the listing broker but did 
not mention the 60/40 split provided for in 
the Settlement Agreement At that time, 
such a splitting of the broker's commission 
was the usual practice in Park City when 
the property was sold by a broker other 
than the listing broker. The Settlement 
Agreement was silent as to whether Union-
america was obligated to refer all "walk-
ins"—prospective buyers who voluntarily 
746 Utah 657 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
approach the owner—to HTA. In a pretrial 
order, the court specifically found that 
there was no express or implied agreement 
regarding "walk-ins" in the Settlement 
Agreement 
On October 3, 1977, Mr. and Mrs. Jack 
Davis traveled from California to Park City 
to see the Village property. They had 
heard of the property from one of Union-
america's officers in California. Arrange-
ments had been made through Unionameri-
ca for Stevenson, a Unionamerica agent, to 
meet the Davises in Park City. Stevenson 
called HTA, but Taylor was out of town. 
Stevenson then called PCR and arranged to 
have its representatives meet with him and 
the Davises. The initial meeting and view-
ing of the property took place on October 4, 
1977. On October 8, 1977, PCR notified 
HTA that they had shown the Village prop-
erty to a prospective buyer without men-
tioning to HTA that the prospective buyer 
had been referred by Unionamerica. A 
week later, after the Davises had orally 
expressed a desire to buy the property, PCR 
asked for and received from Taylor an oral 
confirmation of the 60/40 split in the event 
of a sale. 
On October 17,1977, the PCR representa-
tives went to California where they negoti-
ated an Earnest Money Agreement which 
was signed by the buyer and Unionamerica 
on the same day. On October 19,1977, this 
agreement was delivered to Taylor who 
then asked how PCR had found the buyer. 
The PCR representative told Taylor that 
Davis had been contacted while skiing in 
Park City. Taylor subsequently learned, 
however, that the Davises had been re-
ferred to PCR by Unionamerica. On Octo-
ber 24, 1977, Taylor notified PCR and Un-
ionamerica that he felt HTA was entitled to 
the entire 6% commission because Unionam-
erica should have referred the buyer to 
HTA. 
Later in the day on October 24,1977, the 
parties and Mr. Davis met in the offices of 
Unionamerica's attorneys to sign a real es-
tate agreement for the sale of the property. 
Paragraph 13 of the agreement provided: 
13. Broker's Commission. The parties 
hereto agree that at the time of initial 
closing of this transaction, the entire bro-
ker's commission . . . shall be due and 
payable by Seller, said commission being 
in the amount of $96,000. The parties 
determined that $57,600 of this eommis-
sion shall be payable to [PCR], the selling 
broker, and $38,400 of this commission 
shall be payable to Hal Taylor & Assoc*, 
ates, the listing broker. Should any dis-
pute arise between the brokers, the entire 
commission shall be retained by an es-
crow agent in an interest bearing account 
untfl settlement or resolution of the mat-
ter by the brokers. 
Apparently, there was heated discussion of 
this provision which resulted in conflicting 
testimony at trial. The defendants asserted 
that on behalf of HTA, Taylor orally agreed 
to paragraph 13; Taylor claimed that he 
agreed only to the sale of the property but 
that he specifically disagreed with para-
graph 13. The trial court made no finding 
with regard to the existence of an agree-
ment In any event, Taylor left the meet-
ing without signing the agreement 
At the time of the "initial closing" in May 
of 1978, Unionamerica placed the entire 
$96,000 commission in an interest bearing 
escrow account Taylor and HTA filed suit 
on June 15, 1978. Until the defendants 
filed their answers, none of the parties ever 
contended that HTA was not entitled to at 
least 40% of the commission. 
At trial, the plaintiffs argued thatUM 
Settlement Agreement between Unionani 
erica and HTA was orally modified so thai 
Unionamerica was obligated to refer "walk 
ins" to HTA; that regardless of any modrfir 
cation, Unionamerica had a fiduciary*!* 
good faith duty to do so; that PCR bread 
ed a duty to HTA by its concealment ol 
Unionamerica's referral; that the defend 
ants conspired in order to harm HTA;*th« 
for lack of capacity, PCR could not counteg 
claim for 60% of the commission becauS 
PCR had failed to file an assumed nam 
certificate authorizing PCR to do busmen 
as Skyline Realty, under which name PG| 
had acted; and that Unionamerica fill 
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breached its agreements with HTA and act-
ed unreasonably and in bad faith when it 
held the entire commission in escrow. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the trial court found: that the Settle-
ment and Listing Agreements between Un-
ionamerica and HTA were not orally modi-
fied, nor did they contain any express or 
implied provision requiring Unionamerica to 
refer "walk-ins" to HTA; that there was no 
factual basis for finding any conspiracy, 
Breach of a duty to act in good faith, breach 
of fiduciary duty, or any other tort against 
'any party; that by waiting until almost the 
close of trial, HTA waived the defense of 
lack of capacity against PCR's counterclaim 
for 60% of the commission: and that Union-
t^ 
america acted reasonably by placing the 
entire commission in escrow. The judg-
ment awarded the entire 6% commission to 
HTA, awarded 60% of that commission to 
PCR from HTA, and awarded no attorney's 
fees to any party. 
The plaintiff and appellant, HTA, raises 
four points on appeal. First, HTA claims 
that the trial court erred in awarding a 
selling broker's commission to PCR because 
(a) there was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish that PCR was the "procuring cause" of 
the sale and (b) PCR's lack of capacity 
should have barred its claim. Second, even 
if PCR was entitled to 60% of the commis-
sion from HTA, HTA claims that it was 
entitled to compensatory damages from Un-
ionamerica in an amount equal to that 
awarded to PCR because (a) Unionamerica 
breached a fiduciary duty to HTA, and (b) 
there was an implied agreement that Un-
ionamerica would refer "walk-ins" to HTA. 
Third, HTA asserts that the trial court 
erred in failing to award punitive damages 
to HTA from each defendant. Finally, 
HTA contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to award to HTA attorney's fees 
against Unionamerica. We address these 
issues in the above order. 
1 
[1,2] In its Findings of Fact, the trial 
court found that the defendant, PCR, "fully 
performed the obligations required of a sell-
ing broker under the fee splitting agree-
ment " and therefore, PCR was enti-
tled to 60% of the commission. It is HTA's 
contention that the property was actually 
sold to the buyer by the owners, Unionam-
erica, and that PCR did not perform acts 
sufficient to become the "procuring cause" 
of the sale. HTA quotes from Frederick 
May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 
266 (1962), which discusses the factors in-
volved in "procuring cause." This Court 
said: 
However, the extent to which the bro-
ker's efforts must induce the sale depends 
on the terms used in the contract and the 
understanding and intention of the par-
ties in making such agreement and the 
facts and circumstances of the case. 
Id. at 43, 368 P.2d at 269 (emphasis added). 
HTA places great emphasis on the necessity 
for the initial contact with the buyer, but it 
is clear from Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 
and other cases cited by PCR, that no single 
act will constitute procuring cause under all 
circumstances. In this case, the trial court 
heard the evidence regarding PCR's func-
tions as a broker and found that PCR per-
formed all the obligations of a selling bro-
ker. It is well established that this Court ] 
will presume findings of fact to be correct / 
and will not overturn them so long as they ( 
are supported by substantial evidence in ther^ 
record. See, e,g, PiacitelH v. Southern^ 
Utah State College, Utah, 636 P.2d 1063 
(1981). The Court must view the evidence^ 
and all inferences that might reasonably be / 
made from the evidence in a light mostr 
favorable to the judgment entered. See) 
Id; Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, Utah, 613 
P.2d 512 (1980). The trial court heard am-
ple evidence to support its finding: the 
record shows that PCR traveled to Califor-
nia, negotiated and drafted an earnest mon-
ey agreement, assisted in the negotiation of 
the real estate agreement, and for many 
months thereafter expended considerable 
effort to bring the sale to a close. On the 
basis of this evidence, the findings of the 
trial court that PCR was entitled to a sell-
ing broker's portion of the commission must 
be affirmed. 
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[3,4] HTA also contends that, even if 
PCR earned the seller's commission, PCR is 
barred from asserting its claim because of 
its lack of capacity. On the last day of 
trial, HTA introduced, as evidence of PCR's 
lack of capacity, a certificate from the Sec-
retary of State which indicated that a 
search had been made and no record existed 
that PCR had ever filed to use the name 
Skyline Realty. This certificate was dated 
January 4,1980, 26 days before it was intro-
duced at trial. For 26 days, HTA knew of 
this document but failed to make use of it 
or give notice of the problem regarding 
capacity to opposing counsel. HTA claimed 
that local Rule 10 of the Third District 
Court prevented the giving of notice. Rule 
10 specifies that discovery proceedings, the 
filing of documents with the court, and all 
pretrial motions must be completed 30 days 
before commencement of trial. However, 
the rule also states that the right to conduct 
discovery within the 30-day period is at the 
discretion of the court and that nothing in 
the rule "shall preclude or limit voluntary 
exchange of information or discovery " 
Thus, Rule 10 has no application here. Fur-
thermore, Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that a party may 
amend his pleading by leave of the court or 
consent of the adverse party and that such 
leave "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." There is nothing in the record 
which suggests that HTA made any at-
tempt to amend its pleading to conform 
with Rule 9(aXl) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which requires that the defense 
of lack of capacity be raised by specific 
negative averment When HTA obtained 
the Secretary of State's certificate, there 
were 10 days remaining before commence-
ment of trial, ample time for PCR to re-
spond to such an amendment In view of 
the circumstances and the provisions of the 
rules discussed, it is clear that HTA had the 
opportunity to give notice of its defense of 
lack of capacity. HTA chose not to do so. 
Thus, we hold that the trial court was cor-
rect in ruling that HTA waived this de-
fense* 
[5,6] It should be noted that notice and 
the resulting opportunity to respond are the 
critical factors in requiring compliance with 
Rule 9(aXl). If the party against whom 
the defense is asserted has notice and an 
opportunity to respond, the issue need not 
be raised specifically in the pleadings. See 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 899 (1958). It 
must be emphasized, however, that the no. 
tice must be definite and clear. The «j* 
sponding party need not guess what hidden 
defenses may be raised. HTA asserts that 
because "illegality" was plead as an affirm-
ative defense and because subject matter 
jurisdiction may be contested at any tunS 
HTA's defense of lack of capacity was p ^ 
served. Pleadings of illegality and lack a? 
subject matter jurisdiction do not put a 
party on notice to respond to a defense of 
lack of capacity. Were we to rule other-
wise, Rule 9(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Gig 
Procedure would become a nullity. 
HTA also argues on appeal that HTA 
should receive compensatory damages from 
PCR in the amount of the 60% portion of 
the commission because of PCR's alleged 
breach of fiduciary or good faith dutyfai 
failing to disclose the referral from Unioa-
america. This question will be discussed 
below in conjunction with the existence of £ 
fiduciary relationship between HTA ao^ 
Unionamerica. 
2 
[7] The major issue in this appeal, ft 
well as at trial, is whether a fiduciary film 
tionship existed between HTA and Union? 
america. In Utah, as elsewhere, a real4« 
tate broker is held to be the agent of t&i 
property owner for whom he acts. JUii 
agent, he owes a fiduciary duty to his p 
cipal. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Wardley I 
Utah, 611 P.2d 1204 (1980). However, jf lj 
generally recognized that no reciprocal duW 
runs from the principal to the broker. JCMf 
principal's duty to his broker is one of goo( 
faith in the execution of the brokerage r~ 
tract which established the relation 
We find no Utah law which would raiseJL 
good faith duty to the higher standarijSB 
posed on those with fiduciary responsfljffl 
ities. 
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[S-10] A fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship may be created by contract or by 
drcumstances where equity will imply a 
Irigher duty in a relationship because the 
irusting party has been induced to relax the 
care and vigilance he would ordinarily exer-
cise. In such a case, the evidence must 
demonstrate the placement of trust and re-
liance such that the nature of the relation-
ship is clear. See, e.g.t Arnoult v. Griffin, 
Tenn.App., 490 S.W.2d 701 (1972). In the 
instant case, the relationship between HTA 
and Unionamerica was created by the Set-
tlement and Listing Agreements. The rec-
ord reveals no basis for implying a relation-
ship of special reliance and trust To the 
contrary, the record reveals that these par-
ties found it necessary to enter into the 
Settlement Agreement because of a previ-
ous suit brought by Taylor alleging breach 
of contract and tortious conduct Adver-
sarial postures in a lawsuit do not suggest 
confidence or trust We find that Union-
america owed no fiduciary duty to its bro-
ker, HTA, based on the circumstances of 
their relationship. Neither do we find that 
the language of the Settlement Agreement 
or Listing Agreement created any extraor-
dinary duty to HTA beyond the ordinary 
duty of good faith in the performance of 
contracts. 
[11-14] HTA also alleges error in the 
pretrial order which found no implied provi-
sion in either of the parties' agreements 
requiring Unionamerica to refer all "walk-
in" buyers to HTA. When a question arises 
regarding a written document, the first 
source of inquiry must be the document 
Hself, considered in its entirety. See Larra-
bee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., Utah, 614 
P.2d 160 (1980). Neither of the agreements 
contain any express mention of "walk-ins". 
It is a long-standing rule in Utah that per-
sons dealing at arm's length are entitled to 
contract on their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts to relieve either 
party from the effects of a bad bargain. 
See, e.g, Biesinger v. Behunin, Utah, 584 
P.2d 801 (1978). This Court will not rewrite 
& contract to supply terms which the parties 
omitted. See Tomino v. Greater Park City 
Co., Utah, 570 P 2d 698 (1977). HTA and 
Unionamerica were experienced in their 
business and had every reason to protect 
themselves in entering into the settlement 
of a lawsuit The Settlement Agreement 
clearly does not make HTA the sole and 
exclusive agent for Unionamerica, because 
it contemplates the split of commissions be-
tween listing and selling brokers. We find 
no implied provision regarding the referral 
of "walk-in" buyers. "(T]t is not for a court 
to rewrite a contract improvidently entered 
into at arm's length or to change the bar-
gain indirectly on the basis of supposed 
equitable principles." Dalton v. Jerzco Con-
struction Co., Utah, 642 P2d 748, 750 (1982) 
(citations omitted). The order and findings 
of the trial court in this regard are af-
firmed. 
[15] At trial, HTA contended that the 
Settlement and Listing Agreements were 
orally modified by discussion at the time 
the Settlement Agreement was signed. 
Conflicting testimony was heard by the 
court Where the evidence is in conflict, we j 
defer to the trial court's first-hand assess-/ 
ment of the witnesses' credibility and as-* 
sume that the trial court believed those p 
aspects of the evidence which support its\ 
findings. See, e.g., Fillmore City v. Reeve, \ 
Utah, 571 P.2d 1316 (1977). The trial court 
found no oral modification requiring Union-
america to refer "walk-in" buyers to HTA. 
Such a finding of fact will not be disturbed 
by this Court where there is supporting 
evidence in the record. See Piacitelli v. 
Southern Utah State College, supra. The 
finding is therefore affirmed. 
In summary, we hold that Unionamerica 
had no fiduciary duty to protect HTA by 
referring all inquiries to HTA exclusively. 
Further, we have found no express or im-
plied requirement to do so in the parties' 
written agreements and no oral modifica-
tion to that effect Because there was no 
duty, there was no breach. Therefore, we 
affirm the trial court's refusal to award 
HTA compensatory damages from Steven-
son and Unionamerica in the amount of the 
commission awarded to PCR. 
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[16] If Unionamerica had no duty ^ 
refer all "walk-in" inquiries to HTA, th e n 
regardless of the characterization given to 
the ra)Mj£>72sh}p between BTA 22>d J*Qft 
PCR cannot have breached any duty by j ^ 
failure to inform HTA that the buyer had 
been referred from Unionamerica. T h s ^ 
fore, we also affirm the trial court's re fu^ 
to award to HTA compensatory damage 
from PCR. 
3 
[17] The appellant, HTA, claims error j n 
the trial court's refusal to award punitive 
damages. HTA acknowledges the g e n e ^ 
rule that punitive or exemplary dama^es 
are generally not recoverable in contr^ct 
actions. However, HTA cites our opinion j n 
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., Utah, 585 P.2d ?75> 
778 (1978), for the proposition that "the 
nature and type of the wrongful conduct" 
should determine whether punitive da*n_ 
ages should be awarded. In applying thjs 
statement to the instant case in support
 0f 
an award of punitive damages, HTA re^jg 
Nasi too broadly. In Nash, the plaintiff 
prayed for and received an equitable rerr^ 
dy but was denied punitive damages by t^e 
trial court Our opinion discussed the av^jj. 
ability of punitive damages in an equitafye 
action and the relationship between t^e 
amount of punitive damages awarded a ^ 
the amount of compensatory damage 
That discussion is inapposite here. It fe 
true that in some jurisdictions punitiye 
damages may be awarded in cases involving 
contracts where the breaching party's CQn. 
duct is characterized by extreme bad f aity, 
malice or recklessness. See, e.g., Tac^t 
Club Sales & Service, Inc. v. First Natio^ 
Bank of North Idaho, 101 Idaho 852, 633 
P.2d 464 (1980); State Farm General Ins^ 
ance Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P^j 
798 (1974). We prefer the standard arti(vu. 
Isted by the K&tzs£f Supreme Ge&tix 6&nm. 
zalez v. Allstate Insurance Co., 217 Ka^ 
262, 535 P.2d 919 (1975), which states th a t 
breach of contract, standing alone, does n0t 
call for punitive damages even if intention. 
al and unjustified, but such damages ar e 
allowable if there is some independent t o ^ 
indicating malice, fraud or wanton disr^ 
gard for the rights of others. See also Doltf 
v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Haw. 18, 501 Pjy 
368 (1972); Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chev. 
/v/et Cb., 227 Kan. 45, 605 P.2d 95 (1980f 
Jackson v. Glasgow, OkLApp., 622 P.2d 1088 
(1980). 
[18] In the instant case, HTA alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty 
to act in good faith, constructive fraud, 
conspiracy, conversion and intentional in-
fliction of mental distress. We have al-
ready found that neither Unionamerica nor 
PCR breached a duty which would warrant 
the award of compensatory damages. The 
trial court found that there was no factual 
basis to support the allegations of other 
tortious conduct. Our review of the record 
leads us to the same conclusion and thus we 
affirm the trial court's finding. Therefore, 
having found no independent tort, we see 
no basis for the award of punitive damages 
in this contract case and affirm the denial 
of punitive damages by the tria) court 
4 
[19] Finally, HTA alleges error in the 
trial court's failure to award attorney's fees 
for the recovery of its 40% portion of the 
commission, and error in the trial court's 
finding that Unionamerica acted reasonably 
in depositing the entire commission in es-
crow. However, the propriety of the es-
crow deposit was not addressed as an issue 
at trial, nor is it raised as an issue on this 
appeal. In fact, Unionamerica sought pre-
trial relief in the nature of interpleader, 
and although its motion therefor was de* 
nied, the district court sanctioned the prior 
deposit of the commission funds in escroy; 
and further ordered the funds to be main^  
tained in an interest bearing account Ifo 
appeal was taken from that order. Pur-
thermore, a review of the trial transcript 
reveals that HTA did not address the issote 
of attorney's fees at trial, beyond reference 
to it in counsel's opening statement »\Jtj 
rested its case without presenting or prof| 
fering evidence on the issue, and it neither 
sought nor obtained leave of court to.reg 
open its case at a later time for that p i 3 
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pose. In accord with the well-established 
rule of law that requires an award of attor-
ney's fees to be supported by evidence, the 
trial court did not commit error in declining 
to make an award. 
The actions of the trial court are there-
fore affirmed. No costs awarded. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
| KEY NUMBER S Y S T E M ^ 
Jack E. HORGAN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, Abe W. Mathews 
Engineering Corporation, a Minnesota 
Corporation, Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 18104. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 29, 1982. 
Former employee brought action 
against his former employer seeking to re-
cover additional compensation following his 
termination. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., granted 
summary judgment in favor of former em-
ployers on basis of a release executed by the 
parties, and former employee appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that 
former employee did not sign the mutual 
Release under duress and therefore the re-
kase was valid and enforceable and barred 
^ployee's suit 
Affirmed. 
*• Judgment <$=> 181(2) 
Mere existence of genuine issues of 
ract in the case as a whole does not pre-
clude entry of summary judgment if those 
issues are immaterial to resolution of the 
case. 
2. Release <s=*18 
Former employee was not compelled by 
duress to sign a release in connection with 
settlement reached with employers follow-
ing his termination. 
3. Release <3=»1 
A release is a type of contract and may 
generally be enforced or rescinded on the 
same grounds as other contracts. 
4. Release G=>1 
Mere fact of an improvident or bad 
bargain or a feeling of latent discontent is 
not a sufficient basis to avoid effect of an 
otherwise valid release. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
William L. Crawford, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
On this appeal plaintiff Jack Horgan, a 
former employee of the defendant corpora-
tions, seeks reversal of the trial court's ad-
verse summary judgment in an action to 
recover losses stemming from the termina-
tion of plaintiffs employment 
Plaintiff began employment as an engi-
neer with defendant Abe W. Mathews En-
gineering Corporation (AWMECO), a Min-
nesota corporation, in October 1957. In 
1976 AWMECO acquired defendant Indus-
trial Design Corporation (IDC), a Utah cor-
poration. To assist in the supervision of 
this newly acquired subsidiary, the AWME-
CO directors decided to transfer plaintiff 
from Minnesota to Utah. Plaintiff agreed 
to make the transfer, allegedly in reliance 
upon oral assurances that all moving ex-
penses would be paid, that he would receive 
bonuses and options for stock in IDC, and 
that he could eventually assume the presi-
dency of IDC. Plaintiff subsequently 
moved to Utah, was paid over $6,800.00 in 
moving expenses, and went on the IDC 
payroll July 1, 1977. 
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A.2d 526 (1970), the court held that implied 
in a lease for used residential apartment 
space was a duty on the part of the landlord 
to make repairs to vital facilities caused by 
ordinary wear and tear. Several courts 
have held that when determining whether 
any implied covenants or warranties exist 
in a sale or lease of real property, the intent 
of the parties should be analyzed as should 
the importance of the defective item to the 
comfortable enjoyment of the premises. 
See id.; Bermes v. Facell, La.App., 328 
So.2d 722 (1976). 
[9,10] In the case at hand, the plaintiff 
complains that the trial court held the de-
fendant liable only for those repair and 
replacement costs necessary to bring the 
air-conditioning system up to the proper 
operating level of a used, 13-year-old sys-
tem. The plaintiff knew the building and 
the air-conditioning system were used. Al-
though the doctrine of caveat emptor is 
slightly modified in this case by the terms 
of the contract, it is not abandoned. In 
interpreting the terms of the contract, the 
court must look to the agreement as a 
whole, to the circumstances, nature and 
purpose of the contract. Maw v. Noble, 10 
Utah 2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 (1960); 17 Am. 
Jur.2d Contracts §§ 245, 246. Thus, where 
the parties bargained for the purchase of 
the 13-year-old building and air-condition-
ing system, and the vendor agreed to keep 
the premises in good condition and make all 
necessary repairs and replacements, it can 
reasonably be assumed that those repairs 
and replacements were not to be of such a 
nature as to require the vendor completely 
to renovate the building. Those repairs and 
replacements called for under the terms of 
the contract were those required to main-
tain the building and air-conditioning sys-
tem in an operational condition for a build-
ing and air-conditioning system of like age 
and usage. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate here-
in; PALMER, District Judge, sat 
EXHIBIT 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Clyde 
L. CHRISTENSEN, Deceased. 
v. 
Virginia T. CHRISTENSEN, Appellant 
No. 17892. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 8, 1982. 
Appeal was taken from a judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
James S. Sawaya, J., granting executor's 
motion to dismiss widow's petition under 
"omitted spouse" statute. The Supreme 
Court, Oaks, J., held that: (1) fact that 
testator's bequest of corporate stock to wid-
ow before their marriage may not have 
been made in contemplation of that mar-
riage did not make widow an "omitted 
spouse" under statute so as to entitle her to 
50 percent of his estate; (2) there was 
substantial support for conclusion that tes-
tator did not fail to provide by will for his 
surviving spouse, and therefore "omitted 
spouse" statute was inapplicable; and (3) 
executor was equitably estopped from later 
changing its position and asserting that 
widow was barred from claim for automo-
bile by court's order granting executor's 
petition for confirmation of sale of personal 
property by which automobile was sold. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Wills <s=*358 
Order admitting will to probate in 
course of formal testacy proceedings is final 
order for purposes of appeal. U.CAJ953, 
75-3-412(1). 
2. Wills <e=*788 
Trial court's dismissal of petition by 
widow alleging she was entitled to 50 per-
cent of testator's estate as an "omitted 
spouse" under statute was a final appeals-
E 
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U.C.A.1953, 75-2-301, 75-3- eluded, marriage was extremely brief, and ble order. 
412(1). 
3. Wills <s=>785(l) 
Fact that testator's bequest of corpo-
rate stock to widow prior to their marriage 
may not have been made in contemplation 
of that subsequent marriage did not render 
widow an "omitted spouse" under statute so 
as to entitle her to 50 percent of his estate. 
U.CJL1953, 75-2-301. 
4. Wills <s=>788 
Where testamentary gift by testator to 
spouse cannot be shown to have been made 
in contemplation of marriage, surviving 
spouse is permitted to show that in circum-
stances presented, including provision of 
particular testamentary gift, testator failed 
to provide by will for his surviving spouse 
so as to make that spouse an "omitted 
spouse" under statute; among considera-
tions relevant to that factual conclusion 
are: alternative takers under will, dollar 
value of testamentary gift to surviving 
spouse, fraction of estate represented by 
that gift, whether comparable gifts were 
made to other persons, length of time be-
tween execution of testamentary instru-
ment and marriage, duration of marriage, 
any inter vivos gifts testator has made to 
surviving spouse, and separate property and 
needs of surviving spouse. U.C.A.1953, 75-
2-30L 
5. Wills <s=»788 
Burden of establishing that particular 
testamentary gift did not "provide" for sur-
viving spouse so as to render that spouse an 
"omitted spouse" under statute is on surviv-
ing spouse; in order to satisfy that burden, 
evidence must be sufficient to establish that 
testamentary gift could not reasonably rep-
resent testator's effort to provide by will 
for surviving spouse. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-
30L 
6. Wills te788 
Where though amounting to only four 
percent of total value of estate, widow's 
$436,000 testamentary gift had substantial 
dollar value, marriage occurred relatively 
short time after execution of codicils in 
which widow's testamentary gift was in-
record suggested that testator made signifi-
cant inter vivos gifts to widow, there was 
substantial support for conclusion that tes-
tator did not fail to provide by will for his 
surviving spouse, and therefore "omitted 
spouse" provision in statute was inapplica-
ble. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-301. 
7. Estoppel <3=»63 
Where executor's trust officer tele-
phoned widow's counsel, who informed him 
that widow claimed ownership of automo-
bile in question, where the two then agreed 
that widow would not object to sale, but 
would make claim to proceeds rather than 
to automobile itself, and where apparently 
neither communicated such agreement to 
executor's attorney, executor was equitably 
estopped from later changing its position 
and asserting that widow's claim *&* 
barred by court's order granting executor's 
petition for confirmation of sale of personal 
property by which automobile was sold. 
David E. West, Frank Armstrong, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant 
David S. Geldzahler, John M. Bradley, 
Salt Lake City, for respondent 
OAKS, Justice: 
Appellant, who married the 83-year-old 
testator six weeks before his death, con-
tends that she is entitled to 50 percent of 
his $10 million estate as an "omitted 
spouse" under U.C.A., 1953, § 75-2-301. 
She claims the intestate share specified 
where "a testator fails to provide by will 
for his surviving spouse who married the 
testator after the execution of the 
will " The district court granted the 
executor's motion to dismiss appellant's pe-
tition on the ground that she was not an 
omitted spouse because she was provided 
for in the testator's will. (The court did not 
resolve the executor's challenge to the va-
lidity of the marriage.) We affirm that 
decision, but modify the court's judgment 
on a lesser issue. 
648 Utah 655 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Appellant and testator had occupied ad-
joining condominium units in Salt Lake 
City since 1966. According to her affidavit, 
she "cared and provided for him" and the 
two "had a close relationship." Testator 
executed his last will in 1976, leaving the 
bulk of his estate in trust for the benefit of 
his granddaughter. 
In a codicil executed in 1977, the testator 
bequeathed 3,000 shares of Norton Compa-
ny stock to appellant. In a second codicil, 
executed in 1979, he bequeathed 8,000 
shares of this stock to appellant. The par-
ties disagree whether the total bequest was 
for 8,000 shares or for 11,000 shares, but 
agree that the will, as modified by the 
codicils, gave appellant at least 8,000 shares, 
whose value at the date of death proved to 
be $436,000. 
The testator married the appellant, Vir-
ginia Thompson, on October 14, 1980, in 
Elko, Nevada. The testator died November 
26, 1980. He left an estate valued at over 
$10 million. His will was admitted to pro-
bate and the respondent bank was appoint-
ed executor on December 24,1980. On that 
same date, the court declared testator's 
heirs to include "Virginia Thompson," 
whom the court described as a "Specific 
Legatee and Alleged Spouse." 
Although appellant did not contest this 
order of the court, she later filed a petition 
praying, inter alia, for a determination that 
she was an omitted spouse under § 75-2-
301, and for an order awarding her the 
proceeds of the sale of an automobile. The 
executor moved to dismiss the petition. 
Appellant filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment. The district court dis-
missed the petition insofar as it related to 
both of appellant's contentions, and she 
took this appeal. 
I. FINAL JUDGMENT 
A threshold question in this appeal is 
whether the order of the district court dis-
1. If a testator fails to provide by will for his 
surviving spouse who married the testator 
after the execution of the will, the omitted 
spouse shall receive the same share of the 
estate he would have received if the decedent 
left no will unless it appears from the will 
missing the petition of the "omitted spouse" 
is a final appealable order. We hold that it 
is. 
[1] An order admitting a w ill to probate 
in the course of formal testacy proceedings 
is a final order for purposes of appeal 
U.C.A., 1953, § 75-3-412(1); In re Estate 
of Decker, 194 Colo. 143, 570 P.2d 832 
(1977); New Topic Service Volume, Am. 
Jur.2d Uniform Probate Code § 56 (1974). 
[2] The order dismissing an omitted 
spouse's petition is similar in that it resolves 
an issue of vital importance and concludes a 
major phase in the process of formal testa-
cy proceedings. Failure to allow an appeal 
from such an order could compel all subse-
quent proceedings, including partial distri-
butions, to go forward under a cloud of 
uncertainty that would seriously impair the 
personal representative's efforts to adminis-
ter the estate. The order is therefore final 
for purposes of appeal. 
II. PROVISION FOR SURVIVING 
SPOUSE 
[3] Section 75-2-301 of the Utah Pro-
bate Code, which is quoted in full in the 
footnote and which is identical to the corre-
sponding section of the Uniform Probate 
Code,1 has never been construed by thia 
Court, and has rarely been construed in 
other jurisdictions. See annotations to Uni-
form Probate Code § 2-301, 8 U.LA. 131 
(Supp.1982). The section is obviously de-
signed to avoid the unintentional disinheri-
tance of the spouse of a decedent who exe-
cuted a will prior to the marriage and ne-
glected to revise it afterwards. According 
to the Editorial Board Comment, the sec-
tion "reflects the view that the intestate 
share of the spouse is what the decedent 
would [have] wantfed] the spouse to have if 
he had thought about the relationship of his 
old will to the new situation." 
that the omission was intentional or the tes-
tator provided for the spouse by transfer out-
side the will and the intent that the transfer 
be m lieu of a testamentary provision is 
shown by statements of the testator or from 
the amount of the transfer or other evidence. 
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Appellant's contention that she is an 
"omitted spouse" for whom the testator 
wfail[ed] to provide by will," § 75-2-301, 
must be considered against the background 
of the common law and succeeding statutes. 
At common law, a man's will was revoked 
by his subsequent marriage and birth of 
issue. T. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law 
of Wills § 85 (2d ed. 1953). Later legisla-
tion in England and most states in this 
country provided that a man's will was re-
voked merely by marriage if his wife sur-
vived him and was not provided for by a 
marriage settlement or in the will or other-
wise mentioned so as to negate an intention 
to revoke. See Bordwell, "The Statute Law 
of Wills/' 14 Iowa L.Rev. 283, 298-301 
(1929). Utah had such a statute from the 
earliest days of statehood until it was re-
pealed by enactment of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code. Utah Rev.Stats., 1898, § 2754; 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 74-1-24 and -25 (re-
pealed). Although the Uniform Probate 
Code does not achieve its result by specify-
ing revocation of the will, its requirement 
that an omitted spouse not provided for in 
the will receive the share he or she would 
have inherited by intestacy clearly reflects 
a familiar and long-standing feature of the 
law of wills. 
Appellant contends that the testator's be-
quests of corporate stock in the 1977 and 
1979 codicils do not constitute a "provision] 
by will for his surviving spouse" that would 
preclude the applicability of § 75-2-301 be-
cause (1) they were not made in contem-
plation of her marriage to the testator, and 
(2) their value was too minimal in relation 
to the overall value of the estate. 
(1) Some statutes in force when the Uni-
form Probate Code was drafted specified 
that in order to avoid the rule of revocation 
by marriage a provision for the surviving 
spouse must have been included in the will 
to contemplation of marriage. In other 
words, the will provision must have been 
executed in favor of the recipient in his or 
W capacity as a prospective spouse. Even 
where there was no such requirement in the 
statute, some cases have imposed that re-
quirement, though others have not See 
generally 2 W. Boyce & D. Parker, Page on 
Wills § 21.91 (1960); Annot, 97 A.L.R.2d 
1026 (1964); 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills §§ 582-583 
(1975). 
We are aware of no cases determining 
whether a will provision in favor of a sur-
viving spouse can preclude the applicability 
of the "omitted spouse" provision in § 2 -
301 of the Uniform Probate Code (U.C.A., 
1953, § 75-2-301) where the testamentary 
gift was not made in contemplation of mar-
riage. Even though "contemplation of 
marriage" figured prominently in prior 
statutes and case law, the Uniform Probate 
Code makes no mention of that legal re-
quirement. In a statute so carefully draft-
ed, that omission must have been deliber-
ate. We think it would therefore be inap-
propriate for the "contemplation of mar-
riage" requirement to be re-engrafted by 
judicial decision. The interpretive problems 
entailed in applying that requirement to 
various testamentary dispositions, described 
in Estate of Ganier, Fla.App., 402 So.2d 418, 
421 n. 3 (1981), confirm the wisdom of 
avoiding that requirement unless it is clear-
ly imposed by statute. Here it is not 
We therefore reject appellant's first ar-
gument and hold that a testator can "pro-
vide by will for his surviving spouse" in 
such a way as to prevent the recipient from 
being an "omitted spouse" under § 75-2-
301 even though the testamentary gift was 
not made in contemplation of marriage. 
This was the holding in a case that con-
strued a statute with wording similar to 
this provision of the Uniform Probate Code. 
Estate of Ganier, supra. We find that rea-
soning persuasive of the same result in this 
case. 
(2) Appellant contends that even if the 
testamentary gift need not be made in con-
templation of marriage, by his bequest in 
this case the testator "fail[ed] to provide by 
will for his surviving spouse" within the 
meaning of § 75-2-301 because of the rela-
tively minimal value of the bequest Ap-
pellant argues that allowing a minimal be-
quest made years before marriage to effec-
tively disinherit a spouse who would other-
wise be entitled to an intestate share would 
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contradict the underlying purpose of the 
omitted spouse provision. 
Section 75-2-301 is designed to effectu-
ate, not to circumvent, the testator's in-
tent.2 Pursuant to that purpose, the section 
specifies the intestate share for the "omit-
ted spouse" on the theory that it fairly 
approximates what the testator would have 
bequeathed if he had executed a will after 
the marriage. But that theory is inapplica-
ble where the will contains any bequest to 
the spouse that is clearly made in contem-
plation of their marriage. As was well 
stated by a California court: 
The determinative fact is not the size 
of the gift to the contemplated spouse 
but the fact that the testator has made a 
provision affirmatively showing that he 
had the particular person in mind as a 
contemplated spouse. 
Estate of Bridler, 165 Cal.App.2d 486, 488, 
331 P.2d 1028, 1029 (1958). To grant an 
intestate share where the will contains a 
gift made in contemplation of marriage 
would contradict the testator's intent. In 
that circumstance, the omitted spouse pro-
vision m § 75-2-301 would be inapplicable, 
and the surviving spouse would be left to 
pursue other statutory remedies. 
[4] The more difficult circumstance— 
the one present in this case—is where the 
Testamentary gift cannot be shown to have 
been made in contemplation of marriage. 
Here, the testator's intent cannot be dispos-
itive on the treatment of the "omitted 
spouse" because it is equivocal: he may 
simply have neglected to amend his will 
after marriage, or he may have re-exam-
ined the will and decided that his previous 
testamentary gift would adequately provide 
for his new spouse. In such a case, the 
surviving spouse should be permitted to 
show that in the circumstances presented, 
including the provision of a particular testa-
mentary gift, the testator "fail[ed] to pro-
vide by will for his surviving spouse" within 
the meaning of § 75-2-301. Among the 
considerations relevant to that factual con-
2. Contrast § 75-2-201, which entitles a surviv-
ing spouse to an elective share contrary to the 
elusion are (1) the alternative takers under 
the will, (2) the dollar value of the testa-
mentary gift to the surviving spouse, (3) the 
fraction of the estate represented by that 
gift, (4) whether comparable gifts were 
made to other persons, (5) the length of 
time between execution of the testamenta-
ry instrument and the marriage, (6) the 
duration of the marriage, (7) any inter vivos 
gifts the testator has made to the surviving 
spouse, and (8) the separate property and 
needs of the surviving spouse. For exam-
ple, if a testator's will made token gifts to 
various friends, one of whom married the 
testator years later, the original gift is not 
likely to qualify as a "provision] by will for 
his surviving spouse " 
[5] The burden of establishing that a 
particular testamentary gift did not "pro-
vide" for the surviving spouse for purposes 
of § 75-2-301 is on the surviving spouse. 
In order to satisfy that burden, the evi-
dence must be sufficient to establish that 
the testamentary gift specified before the 
marriage could not reasonably represent 
this testator's effort "to provide by will for 
his surviving spouse." § 75-2-301. 
[6] In this case, the pending motions 
made it evident that both parties were will-
ing to submit the issue on the undisputed 
facts before the district court. Though 
amounting to only four percent of the total 
value of the estate, appellant's $436,000 tes-
tamentary gift had a substantial dollar val-
ue, the marriage occurred a relatively short 
time after the codicils were executed, the 
marriage was extremely brief, and the rec-
ord suggests that the testator made signifi-
cant inter vivos gifts to appellant Conse-
quently, there was substantial support for 
the district court's conclusion that this was 
not a case where the testator had "fail[ed] 
to provide by will for his surviving spouse," 
and the omitted spouse provision in § 75-2-
301 was therefore inapplicable. The dis-
testator's intent. 
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missal of appellant's petition for relief as an 
omitted spouse is therefore affirmed.3 
III. PROCEEDS OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE 
[7] Appellant claims the proceeds of the 
sale of a Lincoln Continental automobile. 
The executor resists this claim on the 
grounds that appellant made no objection to 
the sale and the court confirmed i t The 
circumstances are set forth in the undisput-
ed affidavit of appellant's counsel: In an 
attempt to locate the title certificate, the 
executor's trust officer telephoned appel-
lant's counsel, who informed him that ap-
pellant claimed ownership of this automo-
bile. The officer responded that he had a 
sale, but would not proceed in the face of 
any adverse claim. The two then agreed 
that appellant would not object to the sale, 
but would make claim to the proceeds rath-
er than to the automobile itself. Apparent-
ly neither communicated this agreement to 
the executor's attorney. The court later 
granted the executor's petition for confir-
mation of sale of personal property, and the 
automobile was sold. 
Appellant contends that the executor 
should be estopped from raising the order 
of the court as a defense to her claim. The 
executor counters that appellant's counsel 
acted improperly by communicating directly 
with an adverse party, rather than its coun-
sel, and therefore cannot invoke the doc-
trine of estoppel in this circumstance. The 
executor's attorney claims prejudice in his 
being deprived of the opportunity to deter-
mine whether to conduct the sale forthwith 
or only after litigating the question of own-
ership to the automobile. 
The circumstances of this case fit all the 
elements of equitable estoppel, as specified 
in Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 
Utah, 652 P.2d 1298 (1982); Rice v. Granite 
School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 
(1969); and J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney 
Co., Utah, 534 P.2d 903, 905 (1975). Thus, 
in Rice v. Granite School District, supra, the 
3. In view of this disposition, it is unnecessary 
for us to discuss the remaining provisions of 
§ 75-2-301 or other issues pertaining to the 
defendant was estopped to rely on the stat-
ute of limitations because its insurance car-
rier had induced the plaintiff to delay filing 
her action. Quoting approvingly from an 
earlier authority, we stated: 
Where the delay in commencing an ac-
tion is induced by the conduct of the 
defendant, . . . it cannot be availed of 
. . . as a defense. 
One cannot justly or equitably lull an 
adversary into a false sense of security 
thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of 
limitations, and then be heard to plead 
that very delay as a defense to the action 
when brought. 
23 Utah 2d at 28, 456 P.2d at 163. Similar-
ly, in reasonable reliance upon an agree-
ment with the executor, appellant refrained 
from challenging its petition for confirma-
tion of the sale of the automobile. The 
executor is equitably estopped from later 
changing its position and asserting that ap-
pellant is barred by the court's order. 
Appellant is not precluded from invoking 
equitable estoppel by her attorney's direct 
contact with the executor's trust officer. 
As appellant points out, the executor-bank 
is a sophisticated organization and its trust 
officer an experienced professional. The 
contact, which was initiated by the bank, 
was made in the course of the officer's 
routine duties. In addition, we perceive no 
prejudice resulting to the bank or its coun-
sel from the sale of the automobile before, 
rather than after, the contest over its own-
ership. 
The dismissal of appellant's claim to the 
proceeds of the automobile is therefore re-
versed, and this claim is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. In other respects, the dismissal of ap-
pellant's petition is affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, CJ., STEWART and HOWE, JJ., 
and J. DUFFY PALMER, District Judge, 
concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate here-
in; PALMER, District Judge, sat 
timeliness of appellant's petition, the penalty 
clause of the will, or the executor's capacity to 
attack the validity of the mamage. 
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WHAT CONSTITUTES TRANSFER OUTSIDE THE WILL 
PRECLUDING SURVIVING SPOUSE FROM ELECTING 
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by 
Wanda Ellen Wakefield, J.D. 
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What constitutes transfer outside the will precluding surviving 
spouse from electing statutory share under Uniform Probate Code 
§ 2-301 
The purpose of this annotation is 
to collect and discuss the state and 
federal cases wherein the courts de-
termined whether a particular transfer 
of money or property to a spouse 
during a decedent's lifetime was in-
tended to be in lieu of a testamentary 
provision for that spouse thereby pre-
cluding that spouse from claiming a 
share of the decedent's estate by elec-
tion under § 2-301 of the Uniform 
Probate Code.1 
Since relevant statutes are stated or 
discussed herein only insofar as they 
are reflected in the reported cases 
within the scope of the annotation, 
the reader is advised to consult the 
specific statutes of the particular juris-
diction in which he may be inter-
ested.1 
• 
Recognizing the general rule to be 
that a surviving spouse can elect to 
take under a will, or to take against it 
a certain share in the real and per-
sonal estate of the deceased spouse, 
the drafters of the Uniform Probate 
Code gave to a surviving spouse the 
right to take an elective share of the 
"augmented estate," and spelled out 
the procedure for making the election 
and satisfying the share.8 However, 
the drafters of the Code also recog-
nized that a spouse may provide for 
his spouse's future financial security 
by making various pre-death transfers 
1. Section numbers of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code are represented herein, unless 
otherwise stated, in the form in which 
they appear in the Act as approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws. 
2. For a list of the jurisdictions which 
1214 
of his real and personal property to 
his spouse and that such transfers 
might be intended to be in lieu of any 
possible testamentary provisions that 
spouse might make. For that reason, 
the drafters of the Code provided in 
§ 2-301 that if such a transfer was 
made by a spouse prior to death with 
the intention to provide for his survi-
vor, or if it was clear that the survivor 
was being intentionally omitted from 
the testator's will, the surviving 
spouse would be forbidden to take a 
statutory share. Thus , in the follow-
ing case the court held that the testa-
tor had intended to provide for his 
spouse by certain nontestamentary 
transfers so that she, as the benefi-
ciary of the nontestamentary trans-
fers, was precluded from claiming an 
additional share of the testator's es-
tate. 
Under §2-301(a) of the Uniform 
Probate Code, as enacted by the state 
of New Mexico, providing that should 
a testator fail to provide by will fo. a 
surviving spouse who married the tes-
tator after the execution of the will, 
the omitted spouse shall receive the 
same share of the estate he would 
have received if the decedent left no 
will unless the testator provided for 
the spouse by transfer outside the will 
with the intent that the transfer be in 
lieu of the testamentary provision, the 
court, in Re Estate of Taggart (1980, 
have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, 
see the latest supplement to the Am Jur 
2d Desk Book, Item No. 124. 
3. See, generally, the discussion in 80 
Am Jur 2d, Wills §§ 1651 and 1652. 
11 ALR4th TRANSFERS OUTSIDE WILL—WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE 
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App) 95 NM 117, 619 P2d 562, 11 
ALR4th 1201, held that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the ju-
ry's finding that the testator had 
made certain transfers to his wife 
outside his will and that those trans-
fers were intended to be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision for her. The 
court noted that there were three 
transfers to the spouse, namely, the 
creation of a joint tenancy checking 
account, the creation of a joint ten-
ancy savings account, and the assign-
ment of retirement benefits of ap-
proximately $400 per month to the 
widow, all of which transfers when 
taken together amounted to approxi-
mately 20 percent of rh** ^ ^ H e n i i 
estate. The court rejected the widow's 
argument that the joint tenancy 
checking and savings accounts could 
not be considered to have been trans-
ferred to her inasmuch as the 
amounts in those accounts were being 
used for the day-to-day expenses of 
support for herself and her husband, 
noting that the widow herself testified 
that at the time of creating the joint 
accounts her husband had stated that 
he created them for her protection. 
The court stated that inasmuch as the 
testator's intent at the time of the 
creation of the accounts was to pro-
vide for his spouse, it was irrelevant 
whether or not the amounts of money 
in the accounts were later used for 
that purpose, or used for other pur-
poses. In addition, the court noted 
that the testator had told his close 
friend that his mind was at ease fol-
lowing the various transfers as de-
scribed. The court also noted that 
there was evidence tending to show 
that the testator had other purposes 
in mind for the balance of his estate, 
specifically the support of his mother-
in-law as well as the satisfaction of 
other testamentary gifts. The court 
concluded that since the widow had 
been provided for by transfers made 
to her during the lifetime of the dece-
dent, she was not entitled to a share 
of the decedent's estate under § 2-
301. 
• 
In the following case, the court 
held that there was no evidence that 
the testator had provided or intended 
to provide for the surviving spouse by 
transfer of property outside the will 
in lieu of a testamentary provision for 
the spouse and thus the spouse was 
not precluded from electing to take a 
share of the testator's estate as pro-
vided for by § 2-301 of the Uniform 
Probate Code. 
In Re Estate of Beaman (1978, 
App) 119 Ariz 614, 583 P2d 270, the 
court held that the children of the 
deceased testator had failed to pres-
ent any evidence that the testator 
provided or intended to provide for 
the surviving spouse by transfer of 
property outside of the will, which he 
had made before his marriage, so as 
to preclude the surviving spouse from 
taking her statutory share as provided 
by §2-301 of the Uniform Probate 
Code as adopted in the state of Ari-
zona. The court noted that the evi-
dence tended to show that the surviv-
ing spouse, before the testator's 
death, had taken certain items out of 
the parties' marital home, which she 
alleged to have belonged to her prior 
to her marriage and that, although 
the testator appeared to be pleased 
that he was being abandoned by his 
surviving spouse, he never indicated 
an intention to provide for her with 
the items which she had taken out of 
the home, the court also noted the 
surviving spouse's testimony that, in 
contradiction of what was testified to 
by the testator's children, the money 
which she took from the parties' joint 
savings account was an amount equiv-
alent to that amount which she had 
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deposited into that account at the 
time that they were married. The 
court accordingly reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court and remanded 
to the trial court in order that it 
might enter judgment in favor of the 
surviving spouse, giving to the widow 
her statutory share of the testator's 
estate, as provided for by § 2-301. 
Although it does not discuss the 
issue of what would be a transfer 
outside of the will that would satisfy 
the provisions of § 2-301 of the Ari-
zona Probate Code, inasmuch as 
there was no evidence that such a 
transfer was made, see Re Estate of 
Beauchamp (1977, App) 115 Ariz 
219, 564 P2d 908, in which the court 
held that the testator's second wife 
was an omitted spouse within the 
meaning of that statute so as to be 
entitled to one-half of the decedent's 
estate. The court noted that prior to 
his marriage to his second wife, the 
decedent had executed a will in con-
formance with the provisions of a 
property settlement agreement en-
tered into between himself and his 
first wife, so as to provide that his 
entire estate would go to the children 
of his first marriage following his 
death, and that subsequent to his 
marriage to his second wife the dece-
dent failed to make any provision for 
her, or to change that prior will in 
any way. However, the court noted 
that the testator could have provided 
for his wife by transfers outside of the 
will prior to his death, and that had 
he done so he would not have been 
in breach of the property setdement 
agreement entered into between him-
self and his first wife. 
• 
The following matters are of re-
lated interest. 
Consult POCKET PART in 
L—WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE 11 ALR4th 
kh 1213 
Estoppel or laches precluding law-
ful spouse from asserting rights in 
decedent's estate as against putative 
spouse. 81 ALR3d 110. 
Devolution of gift over upon 
spouse predeceasing testator where 
gift to spouse fails because of divorce. 
74 ALR3d 1108. 
Effect of invalidity of provision con-
ditioning testamentary gift upon di-
vorce of beneficiary, on alternative 
provision conditioning gift upon 
spouse's death. 74 ALR3d 1095. 
Surviving spouse taking elective 
share as chargeable with estate or 
inheritance tax. 67 ALR3d 199. 
Inclusion of funds in savings bank 
trust (Totten Trust) in determining 
surviving spouse's interest in dece-
dent's estate. 64 ALR3d 187. 
Acceptance of benefits under will as 
election precluding enforcement of 
contract right as to property be-
queathed. 60 ALR3d 1147. 
Extension of time within which 
spouse may elect to accept or re-
nounce will. 59 ALR3d 767. 
Validity of inter vivos trust estab-
lished by one spouse which impaired 
the other spouse's distributive share 
or other statutory rights in property. 
39 ALR3d 14. 
Rights of surviving spouse taking 
under or against will as affected by 
provision in will directing conversion. 
33 ALR3d 1280. 
Waiver of right to widow's allow-
ance by antenuptial agreement. 30 
ALR3d 858. 
• 
Kurtz, The Augumented Estate 
Concept Under the Uniform Probate 
Code: In Search of an Equitable Elec-
tive Share. 62 Iowa L Rev 981 (1976-
1977). 
this volume for later cases 
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unfair. For a debtor's attempt to prohibit 
a deficiency judgment under the Commer-
cial Code see, Ruidoso State Bank v. Garcia, 
92 N.M. 288, 587 P.2d 435 (1978). The trial 
court did not err. Section 9-505(2) was not 
applicable. 
The trial court properly concluded that 
§ 9-504 applied. Defendant did not chal-
lenge the court's conclusion that defendant 
violated this section of law. 
Defendant also challenged the court's 
conclusion that defendant failed to act in 
good faith. This conclusion was supported 
by the findings of fact. Section 55-1-203 
imposes an obligation of good faith upon 
the parties as a duty in the performance or 
enforcement of every contract. " '[G]ood 
faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct 
or transaction concerned." Section 55-1-
201(19). "'[Gfcod faith' in the case of a 
merchant means honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing in the trade." Section 
55-2-103(l)(b). 
For a scholarly report on the meaning of 
"good faith" see, Holmes, A Contextual 
Study Of Commercial Good Faith: Good-
Faith Disclosure In Contract Formation, 39 
U.Pitts.L.Rev. 381 (1978). We must recog-
nize the difficulty involved in under-
standing the essential elements necessary, 
from an objective point of view, to consti-
tute good faith. In viewing the evidence, a 
trial judge arrives at findings of fact, based 
upon personal convictions, from the type of 
conduct exercised which smacks of bad 
faith. 
On review, being far removed from the 
courtroom, our duty is to accept the find-
ings of the trial court unless the mere re-
view of the transcript shocks the conscience. 
The trial court properly concluded that 
§ 9-504 applied to defendant's sale of the 
collateral and that defendant's failure to 
act in good faith in the transactions violat-
ed § 1-203. 
What has been decided with reference to 
Begay applies equally to Reeves. 
Defendant violated the terms of § 9-504. 
Begay and Reeves were entitled to the sur-
plus profit made by defendant. Defendant 
emerges as a creditor whose loan plus inter-
est were paid in full. It cannot and it did 
not complain of the amount of surplus 
awarded Begay and Reeves. It is a busi-
ness of long and broad experience as a 
pawn broker. It kept no books or records 
of the sales made of the jewelry. It should 
not plead that the trial court was without 
authority to allow interest from November 
1, 1974. This is the proximate date that 
Begay and Reeves suffered their losses. 
Defendant has had the benefit and use of 
the money during this period of time. Its 
argument was feeble and without citation 
of authority. The point was adequately 
discussed in Briefs-In-Chief filed on behalf 
of Begay and Reeves. Not being meritori-
ous, it deserves no response. 
This appeal should be affirmed. 
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In the Matter of the ESTATE of James 
A. TAGGART, Deceased: 
Wayne P. CUNNINGHAM, Personal Rep-
resentative of the Estate of James A. 
Taggart, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Margie Ames TAGGART, 
Defendant-Appellant 
No. 4095. 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico. 
Sept 9, 1980. 
Widow appealed from judgment of Dis-
trict Court of Dona Ana County, Galvan, D. 
J., finding that decedent was incompetent 
at time of signing power of attorney, and 
that decedent had provided for spouse by 
transfers outside his will, intending such 
transfers to be in lieu of testamentary pro-
visions. The Court of Appeals, Andrews, J^ 
EXHIBIT G 
MATTER OF ESTATE OF TAGGART N.M. 563 
Cite as, N.MJVpp., 619 P.2d 562 
held that: (1) where testimony as to compe- in view of the fact that the Court of Ap-
tence of decedent when giving his wife peals must review the evidence in light 
power of attorney was conflicting, and most favorable to the jury's answer, 
could support either determination, jury's 
answer of incompetence was affirmed, and "* Gifts <3=»30(4) 
(2) evidence was sufficient to support jury's Trusts <3»34(1) 
determination that decedent intended Generally it is held to be not sufficient 
transfers to wife outside of will to be in lieu to show simply the opening of a joint 
of testamentary provision for her. account in the name of one person "and" 
Affirmed. another, "or" another, without more, in or-
der to establish a gift, or trust. 
1. Mental Health <s=>508 
Review of question of competency of 
decedent at time of making of power of 
attorney considers evidence in light most 
favorable to support jury's answer; the an-
swer is not to be set aside unless not sup-
ported by evidence or inferences therefrom. 
2. Evidence <s=>62 
Generally, a person is presumed to be 
competent and initial burden of proof of 
incompetency is upon party challenging 
competency. 
1 Mental Health <3=>333 
In action to determine competency of 
decedent at time of making power of attor-
ney, question was not whether decedent's 
mind was in any way affected or impaired, 
but whether decedent, at time of signing 
power of attorney, was enjoying a lucid 
interval. 
4. Wills <s=*55(2) 
General medical testimony as to compe-
tence or incompetence of a testator, general 
in time sequence that does not focus on any 
lucid intervals, is insufficient to show in-
competence of testator, particularly when 
there is conflicting testimony concerning 
the specific time period in which will is 
signed. 
5. Mental Health <s=>508 
Where testimony as to the then hospi-
talized decedent's competence when he gave 
his second wife of two years a power of 
attorney was conflicting, and the evidence 
supported either a determination of compe-
tence or incompetence, the jury's answer of 
incompetency at time of making the power 
of attorney would be affirmed, particularly 
7. Gifts e=>30(4) 
Question of deep concern of husband as 
to how easily and how quickly his surviving 
wife could have for her use money in bank 
in case of him predeceasing her is not im-
portant on question of whether there was a 
transfer from husband to wife at time of 
opening of joint account; it is intention of 
owner of funds at time of making deposits 
that controls. 
8. Gifts c=>49(5) 
Evidence that transfers of money to 
joint accounts in name of husband and wife 
were made shortly after marriage, and that 
husband said he wanted wife to be protect-
ed, was sufficient to support jury's finding 
that husband intended to provide for wife 
by transfers outside of his will, regardless 
whether funds from those accounts were 
later used by wife to pay day-to-day ex-
penses. 
9. Wills s=>782(ll) 
Evidence was sufficient to support 
jury's determination that it was intent of 
decedent to provide for wife of two years 
by transfers of funds to joint checking and 
savings accounts and by transfer of retire-
ment account to wife, and that these trans-
fers outside of will, executed before his 
marriage, were to be in lieu of testamenta-
ry provision. 
Lloyd 0. Bates, Jn, Las Cruces, for de-
fendant-appellant. 
James T. Martin, Jr., Las Cruces, for 
plaintiff-appellee. 
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OPINION 
ANDREWS, Judge. 
Two questions are presented in this ap-
peal from a district court probate proceed-
ing. The first seeks a determination of the 
evidence required to support the jury's de-
termination of incompetency at the time of 
making the power of attorney; and the 
second, relates to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the jury's determina-
tion that the decedent had made transfers 
outside of his will in lieu of providing for 
his surviving spouse in his will. 
James A. Taggart, a widower, executed a 
will on March 23, 1976, which provided tftat 
his entire estate be placed in trust for the 
benefit of his deceased wife's mother, Mar-
garet L. Taggart,1 and in the event of fter 
predeceasing the testator, the property v^as 
left in three equal parts to Barbara Shan-
non, Wilma P. Swingle and Wayne P. Cun-
ningham.2 
Subsequent to the execution of the will, 
fSagg,ar4i TnaxraA Y\te feifcitftaiA,, ^tergS^ 
Ames Taggart (Margie). Taggart died on 
May 30, 1978. After the probate proceed-
ings had been filed, Margie claimed she \^as 
an omitted spouse pursuant to § 45^2-
301(A), N.M.S.A. (1978 Comp.). The per-
sonal representative (Cunningham) then 
filed a complaint against Margie alleging 
that the decedent, after having made his 
Last Will and Testament and after having 
married Margie, had provided for her by 
transfers outside of the will, and, in partic-
ular by designating her as a joint-tenant on 
a checking account,3 designating her a$ a 
joint-tenant on a savings account,4 and by 
making an election under his retirement 
plan from the Bureau of Reclamation to 
enable Margie to receive life-long retire-
ment benefits in the amount of $410 per 
month. Cunningham also asserted that be-
cause T a ^ a r t was not mentally competent 
1. A second cousin by marnage to decedent, 
consequently the last names are the same. 
2. The three are fnends or distant relatives of 
the deceased. 
3. Account No. 05-35530-0 which had a balance 
of $2,889 87 at the time of decedent's death. 
prior to his death, a power of attorney he 
executed six days before he died was void 
and deeds executed by Margie under the 
power of attorney were also void.5 
After trial, the jury answered interroga* 
tories to the effect that Taggart was not 
mentally competent on May 24, 1978, when 
he signed the power of attorney; that he 
did not intend for the power of attorney to 
be used to transfer his real property into 
joint tenancy; and that he had provided for 
his spouse by transfers outside his will and 
intended for such transfers to be in lieu of 
testamentary provisions for Margie. 
In her appeal, the widow asserts that 
there is not substantial evidence to support 
the jury's answer that Taggart was incom-
petent when he signed the power of attor-
ney; and, there is insufficient evidence as a 
matter of law to support the jury's answer 
that Taggart had made transfers outside 
his will in lieu of providing for his surviving 
spouse in his will. 
The Power of Attorney 
[1] On May 24, 1978, Taggart, who was 
confined to the hospital by an illness which 
resulted in his death on May 30, 1978, exe-
cuted a power of attorney to Margie Ames 
Taggart. Whether Taggart was incompe-
tent when he signed the power of attorney 
is the question before us here. The jury's 
answer to an interrogatory has the posture, 
on appeal, of a finding of fact made by the 
trial court in a non-jury trial. The issue is 
whether the jury's answer is supported by 
evidence. Our review considers the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to support 
the jury's answer; the answer is not to be 
set aside unless the answer is not supported 
by the evidence or inferences therefrom. 
Lovato v. Hicks, 74 N.M. 733, 398 P.2d 59 
(1965V 
4. Account No 33-000-931-6, Mutual Savings 
& Loan Assn with a balance of $15,908 at the 
time of decedent's death. 
5. Some other matters were alleged in the com-
plaint but are not the subject of this appeal. 
MATTER OF ESTATE OF TAGGART 
Cite as, N.M-App., 619 P.2d 562 
N.M. 565 
[2,3] Generally, a person is presumed to 
be competent and the initial burden of 
proof of incompetency is upon the party 
challenging competency. McElhinney v. 
Kelly, 67 N.M. 399, 356 P.2d 113 (1960); In 
the Matter of the Estate of William Grady 
Head, N.M.App., 615 P.2d 271, 1980. The 
question is not whether the mind of Mr. 
Taggart wras in any way affected or im-
paired, but whether he, at the time of sign-
ing the power of attorney, was enjoying a 
lucid interval. In the Matter of the Estate 
of William Grady Head, supra. 
The action of the unimpaired faculties of 
the mind will supply a lucid interval. Al-
though the mental power may be reduced 
below the ordinary standard, yet, if there 
be sufficient intelligence to understand 
and appreciate the act, the mental ability 
to execute the instrument remains and 
the execution thereof is valid. It is 
enough if the mental faculties retained 
sufficient strength to comprehend the act 
to be done. In the Matter of William 
Grady Head, supra, Vol. 19, St.B.Bull. 
page 764. 
If a person's mind is affected or impaired, 
the question is whether he, at the time of 
execution of the instrument was enjoying a 
lucid interval. In the Matter of the Estate 
of William Grady Head, supra. 
The evidence shows that in January, 1978, 
James Taggart was confined to the hospital 
because of pneumonia. At a later date he 
suffered a heart attack and was returned to 
the hospital by ambulance. Ted Wood, the 
head nurse in charge of the intensive care 
unit where Taggart was admitted testified 
that during the period in question Taggart 
was suffering from renal failure, cardiac 
failure with pulmonary edema, pleural effu-
sion, respiratory failure with emphysema, 
bronchitis and asthma in addition to having 
diabetes mellitus and cerebral arteriosclero-
sis with chronic brain syndrome. In re-
viewing his nurse's notes, the same witness 
testified that Taggart was receiving Mepro-
bamate, a sleeping medication, Keflex, an 
antibiotic, Lasix, a diuretic, Thorazine for 
agitation, Librium for sedation and Valium 
for agitation. 
The power of attorney was executed 
some time during the late morning or early 
afternoon hours of May 24, 1978. Accord-
ing to Wood, that morning Taggart was 
referring to people in his past as if they 
were present and in the afternoon hours he 
was disoriented. 
The floor nurse, Margaret Alvarez, testi-
fied that Taggart's general state was one of 
drifting in and out of confusion and disori-
entation. She testified that on the shift 
ending at 7:00 A.M. on May 23rd, Taggart 
did not know where he was; he hit his face 
with a water glass when attempting to 
drink; and that he had slept only thirty 
minutes before 11:30 P.M. of May 22nd, and 
6:30 A.M. of May 23rd. In her opinion, 
since Taggart "could not stay lucid for 
more than an hour" it was unlikely that 
Taggart knew what he was doing during 
the shift ending at 7:00 A.M. on May 23rd. 
Against this general background, Margie 
Ames Taggart, went to the decedent's room 
and procured Taggart's signature on a pow-
er of attorney. Charles Busby, Taggart's 
roommate, testified that Margie Ames Tag-
gart came to the room around twelve 
o'clock and that Taggart refused to sign the 
document. Margie came back later; Tag-
gart then signed the power of attorney. 
The following exchange was had between 
counsel and witness Busby: 
BY MR HUBERT: 
Q. Did you hear Mr. Taggart say any-
thing: 
* * * * * * 
BY MR. BUSBY: 
A. I heard him say he didn't want to 
sign it. 
Q. Did Mrs. Taggart say anything to 
him? 
A. At that time? 
Q. Yes. 
A. She convinced him to sign the paper 
by kissing him, teasing him, that 
kind of thing. 
Q. You had been with Mr. Taggart for 
approximately a day before this 
time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Could you describe to the jury what 
his general condition was in layman's 
terms? 
A. I can't say what-when he was con-
fused and when he wasn't confused 
because I am not aware of his nor-
mal state. I never seen him not once 
that I thought that he was compe-
tent. I thought he was confused the 
whole time. Again, I say I don't 
know what his normal state of mind 
was. 
Q. Did Mrs. Taggart, during this con-
versation tell Mr. Taggart why she 
wanted the legal document executed? 
A. Yes, she needed to get some money 
to pay some bills and living expenses. 
* * * * * * 
A. I believe he was confused the whole 
time, yes, sir. More at sometimes, 
less at sometimes, but I do not think 
he was normal at any time. 
Cunningham also visited the hospital 
room that day between 4:00 P.M. and 5:30 
P.M., and observed that Taggart "was not 
competent at all." He observed the ex-
change between Taggart and Margie, the 
substance of which was "get off my back, 
Margie, all you want was [sic] my blanke-
ty-blank money." Cunningham, a long 
time close personal friend of Taggart, testi-
fied that'Taggart "didn't know who I was," 
that Taggart was "pantomining" like he 
was smoking in bed and like he was drink-
ing with both hands, that Taggart was 
"talking about marching men or ships in 
World War II", and also talking about con-
struction work, "to bring his gloves, to 
bring a wheel barrow, to keep the line taut, 
things of this nature." Cunningham also 
testified that Taggart, in his opinion, would 
not have understood that he was signing a 
power of attorney; that May 24th "wasn't 
any different than any other of the days 
that I visited with him. You know, he 
was-he was just kind of out of it." 
However, even though Nurse Alvarez, 
who had no personal knowledge as to Tag-
gart's condition on the 24th, testified that 
Taggart was confused on occasion, and "un-
able to stay lucid," she responded in the 
positive when asked if there were occasions 
when Taggart was "totally lucid and knew 
what he was doing." Wood, in testifying 
from the floor notes indicated "on 5-24, 
7:00 to 9:00 A.M., awake, very much more 
alert today." Wood's testimony indicated 
that approximately seven hours later, the 
notes show that Taggart "appeared disori-
ented," but he never testified as to personal 
knowledge and observation of Taggart, and 
had no opinion as to Taggart's competency. 
Although Busby believed Mr. Taggart was 
confused, Margie said he was not confused 
at the time he executed the document even 
though Cunningham saw Taggart at 4:00 
P.M. and thought he was confused then. 
The social worker and notary public em-
ployed by the hospital who notarized the 
power of attorney testified as to facts that 
occurred at the time of the signing, includ-
ing talking to Taggart, questioning him, 
asking him if he knew and understood what 
he was doing, if he was willing to sign the 
document, asking him if he knew what it 
was for and various other questions. She 
indicated that in her opinion he knew and 
understood what he was doing. However 
she also testified that no other patient was 
in the room at the time of the signing, see 
Busby testimony, and that Taggart was in 
intensive care when the power of attorney 
was signed. Other evidence is that Taggart 
had been moved out of intensive care prior 
to signing the power of attorney. A second 
hospital social worker who had seen Tag-
gart on many occasions thought he under-
stood what she was talking about with him. 
[4] In the Matter of the Estate of Wil-
liam Grady Head, the court dealt with gen-
eral medical testimony concerning whether 
or not the testator could have had a lucid 
interval at the time he signed an amend-
ment. Judge Sutin noted, "for Dr. Seeling-
er's testimony to be effective, he would 
have had to testify that Mr. Head could not 
have had a lucid interval at the time he 
signed the first amendment" Three things 
may be seen from the Head decision. The 
first is that the presumption is that Mr, 
Taggart was competent. The second is that 
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even a lunatic may make a will for sale of 
property in a lucid interval, and if a per-
son's mind is affected or impaired, the ques-
tion is whether he, at the time of the execu-
tion of the instrument, was enjoying a lucid 
interval. Finally, general medical testimo-
ny as to the competence or incompetence of 
a testator, general in time sequence that 
does not focus on any lucid intervals, is 
insufficient to show incompetence-particu-
Iarly when there is conflicting testimony 
concerning the specific time period in which 
the will is signed. 
However, the instant case differs from 
the Matter of the Estate of William Grady 
Head in that we are not confronted with an 
instance where the testimony in conflict is 
general medical testimony versus a specific 
statement from the time signature was 
made. Rather, we have two conflicting 
statements from the exact moment of sig-
nature. In addition, we have statements 
concerning the lucidity of Mr. Taggart from 
the immediate time surrounding the signa-
ture. 
As noted above, Busby testified that Tag-
gart at first refused to sign the paper but 
was convinced by Mrs. Taggart's "kissing 
him, teasing him, and that kind of thing." 
In seeming contradiction is the testimony of 
the social worker and notary public who 
testified that at the time of the signing she 
talked to Taggart, questioned him, and 
asked if he knew and understood what he 
was doing. It is clear that we are faced 
with a simple factual question which 
presents sufficient evidence to have allowed 
the jury to have decided either way. Cer-
tainly the statements of the social worker 
and the notary public, particularly when 
viewed in conjunction with Wood's testimo-
ny from the floor notes of May 24 stating 
that Taggart was very much more alert 
that day, could have allowed the jury to 
make a determination on the degree of im-
pairment of Taggart's mind and the ques-
tion of whether he, at the time of the 
execution of the instrument, was enjoying a 
lucid interval. 
However, the evidence supports an alter-
native interpretation. Taggart's reluctance 
to sign the document, and Margie's influ-
ence upon him is testified to by Busby and 
is as reliable as the statements of the social 
worker and the notary public, having oc-
curred at approximately the same time. In 
addition, there were the statements of the 
use of medication, the inability of Taggart 
to distinguish between people from the past 
and present, and the fact that he was disori-
ented that afternoon. We, therefore, are 
not dealing with a general statement of 
medical opinion as was the case In the 
Matter of the Estate of William Grady 
Head, id.; rather, it is conflicting testimony 
and the inferences therefrom wrhich would 
have supported the jury's decision. 
[5] Therefore, since we review the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's answer, and since the question is one 
for the factfinder and there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to make its determi-
nation, the jury's answer of incompetency 
at the time of making the power of attor-
ney is affirmed. 
The second issue arises under § 45-2-
301(A), N.M.S.A. (1978 Comp.), and involves 
the question of whether there was substan-
tial evidence to support the jury's verdict 
that James A. Taggart provided for his 
spouse by transfers outside of his will and 
that he intended such transfers to be in lieu 
of a testamentary provision for her. Sec-
tion 45-2-301(A) states: 
If a testator fails to provide by will for 
the surviving spouse who married the tes-
tator after the execution of the will, the 
omitted spouse shall receive the same 
share of the estate he would have re-
ceived if the decedent left no will unless 
it appears from the will that the omission 
wras intentional, or the testator provided 
for the spouse by transfer outside the will 
and the intent that the transfer be in lieu 
of the testamentary provision is shown by 
statements of the testator or from the 
amount of the transfer or other evidence. 
The instant question of what constitutes 
substantial evidence of intent to transfer in 
lieu of testamentary provision appears to be 
an issue of first impression in New Mexico. 
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The Uniform Probate Code Practice Man-
ual provides some illumination on the in-
tended effect of this section. 
Hence, the Code permits, within certain 
limits evidence to establish whether the 
testator would have wanted a share for 
the spouse or child. In the case of a 
spouse married after the execution of the 
will, it must appear from the will that the 
omission was intentional or that the tes-
tator may have provided for the spouse 
by transfer outside the will, such as life 
insurance or joint tenancy arrangements. 
In such cases the intent of the testator 
that these transfers be in lieu of a testa-
mentary provision may be shown by evi-
dence of the testator's statements or the 
amount of the transfer, or other evidence. 
Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual, 
Vol. I, ed. Richard V. Wellman, Second Edi-
tion, 1977, p. 115. 
The question is, therefore, whether such 
indicia as the testator's statements, the 
amount of transfer, and other relevant evi-
dence were present in the instant case. 
At trial, it was asserted that Mr. Taggart 
had made provisions for his wife sufficient 
to demonstrate the intent that these trans-
fers were in lieu of any testamentary provi-
sion. Three such transfers were discussed. 
The first, was creation of a joint tenancy in 
checking account containing approximately 
$2,900. The second, was the creation of a 
joint tenancy in a savings account contain-
ing approximately $15,900. Finally, there 
was the assignments of benefits in a retire-
ment plan which provides Margie Taggart 
with approximately $400 per month. In 
addition to the actual transfers, plaintiff 
sought to show that certain statements of 
the parties and the circumstances surround-
ing the use of the funds in these accounts 
demonstrated transfers intended to be in 
lieu of a testamentary provision. 
Thus, two points must be discussed to 
determine whether the transfers made by 
James Taggart fall within the provision of 
§ 45-2-301(A). The first point is whether 
the creation of the joint tenancy in the 
bank accounts amounts to a transfer within 
the meaning of the statute. The second is 
whether the statements of Mr. Taggart 
made either in contemplation of the mar-
riage or afterward, or the amount of the 
transfers, provide sufficient proof of the 
intent of Taggart to satisfy the plaintiffs 
burden of proving an exception to the omit-
ted spouse statute. 
1. A transfer under § 45-2-301(A). 
[6,7] The statute required that, "the 
testator provided for the spouse by transfer 
outside the will." Defendant-appellant as-
serted that the funds from the joint account 
were used for paying the decedent's ex-
mother-in-law's house bills and cost of liv-
ing* expenses for Mr. Taggart and his wife. 
Also, the savings account was being used to 
pay for the anticipated cost of a rest home. 
This, it is argued, undercuts the assertion 
that these funds had been transferred at 
all. Rather, defendant-appellant asserts 
these funds had not been truly transferred 
to Margie Taggart, but had merely been 
placed in an account convenient for the 
paying of general bills. 
We know that generally it is held to be 
not sufficient to show simply the opening 
of a joint account in the name of one 
person "and" another, "or" another, with-
out more, in order to establish a gift, or a 
trust. Jones v. Fullbright, et a/., 197 N.C. 
274, 148 S E. 229. 
Also, 
The testimony going to the husband's 
deep concern as to how easily and quickly 
his surviving wife could have for her use 
the money in the bank in case of him 
predeceasing her, amply supports the the-
ory that the husband quite properly may 
have given consideration to the provisions 
of the will when he opened the joint 
account or, he may have forgotten or may 
not have been concerned about such will. 
That question is not important. It is the 
intention of the owner of the funds at the 
time of making the deposit that controls. 
Menger v. Otero County State Bank, 44 
N.M. 82, 98 P.2d 834 (1940). 
As in Menger, the question becomes sim-
ply one of whether there was evidence to 
support the jury's answer. If Margie was 
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merely given access to those funds to pro-
vide a convenient method for managing the 
couple's expenses, it was not a transfer to 
her. However, if the intention of the own-
er of the funds at the time of making the 
deposit was that those funds should become 
hers, for her use, it was a proper transfer. 
[8] In this case, the transfers were 
made shortly after the marriage. Also, 
Margie testified that "he (Mr. Taggart) just 
said he wanted me to be protected . . . " If 
such was the case, it is not material wheth-
er funds from those accounts were later 
used to pay day-to-day expenses. It was 
the intent of Mr. Taggart at the time of 
making the transfer which controls. Mea-
ger, id. The foregoing is substantial evi-
dence that Mr. Taggart intended to provide 
for Mrs. Taggart, thereby permitting the 
jury to answer that this was a transfer. 
2. Intent that the transfers be in lieu of 
the testamentary provision. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Tag-
gart intended to transfer the funds in the 
checking, savings, and retirement accounts 
to Margie Taggart, the plaintiffs also had 
the burden of demonstrating that Mr. Tag-
gart considered the fact that she was not a 
beneficiary under the will and had intended 
the transfers to take the place of such tes-
tamentary devise. As noted above, several 
factors may be considered in making this 
determination including the period of time 
which the couple had been married, the 
amount transferred to Mrs. Taggart and 
the portion of the total estate to others. As 
to the first of these factors, the couple had 
been married for less than two years. This 
is not dispositive, but does reflect on intent 
As to the portion transferred to Margie as a 
percentage of the entire estate, plaintiff 
correctly points out that the record is void 
of any reference to the total value of the 
decedent's estate. Richardson Ford Sales v. 
Cummins, 74 N.M. 271, 393 P.2d 11 (1964). 
However, accepting defendant's figures 
that the transfers represented twenty per-
cent of the total estate, this amount when 
added to the $410 monthly retirement bene-
fits would provide Margie with a not insig-
nificant amount. 
[9] The trial court had before it state-
ments from a variety of people concerning 
both Mr. Taggart's intent in making the 
original transfers and his intentions that 
the balance of the estate be used for other 
purposes. Margie herself testified that 
shortly after the marriage both the election 
of benefits and the retirement plan and 
other financial considerations were made to 
"protect" her. Also, Taggart's close friend, 
Wayne Cunningham testified that Taggart 
said "everything was settled and all taken 
care of and that he felt good that every-
thing was taken care of, and he had no 
more worries." Finally, there were state-
ments that the balance of the estate was to 
be used for, among other things, the main-
tenance of Margie Taggart, his former 
mother-in law. Mrs. Taggart, 92 years 
old, testified that Taggart had paid her 
utility bills and had helped her financially 
in other ways for twenty-two years. A 
friend of Taggart's, Dorothy Smith, testi-
fied that Taggart had always taken care of 
the mother-in-law, and that Taggart had 
stated "that he would always see to it that 
Maggie was well-cared for." 
The trial court stated: 
The testimony is conflicting, even from 
the deposition and live witnesses, but the 
testimony that Mr. Taggart intended to 
take care of Mrs. Margaret L. Taggart 
. . . for her lifetime, and that is what the 
will provided may be evidenced, in addi-
tion to other testimony of witnesses, that 
the transfers made were intended in lieu 
of testamentary disposition to the wife. 
It is for the jury to determine. They will 
make that factual determination. 
We believe that the trial court correctly 
stated the law. The jury's determination 
that it was the intent of Mr. Taggart to 
provide for Margie by transfers outside of 
the will was supported by substantial evi-
dence. There was evidence which showed 
his intent to provide her with funds by the 
creation of joint accounts and a retirement 
plan. There was evidence to show that he 
had considered the terms of his will and the 
fact that Margie Taggart was not included 
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in the will. Finally, there was evidence to 
show that it was his intent, even after he 
was married, that a portion of the estate be 
used for other purposes. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
WOOD, C. J., and LOPEZ, J., concur. 
fSwX 
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STATE of New Mexico, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Alex HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant 
No. 4596. 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico. 
Sept 30, 1980. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Eddy County, Fort, D. J., of 
battery upon a police officer, and he appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, J., held 
that: (1) where police officer was conduct-
ing an investigation of reported disturbance 
in routine manner and in lawful discharge 
of his duties, detention of defendant was 
not illegal, and (2) where defendant had 
driven car several feet in arresting officer's 
presence before his arrest, and officer had 
smelled alcohol and noted defendant's 
slurred speech, there was no lack of proba-
ble cause to arrest defendant 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <&=»1083 
When the Court of Appeals denied de-
fendant permission to appeal from interloc-
utory order, the Court of Appeals did not 
assume jurisdiction of matter, and thus jur-
isdiction remained in trial court and there 
v\as nothing to prevent trial court from 
proceeding to trj pending case, e\en though 
defendant's trial commenced one day before 
issuance of mandate denying his interlocu-
tory appeal. Rules of Criminal Appellate 
Procedure, Rule 203; NMSA 1978, §§ 39-
3-3, subd. A(3), 39-3-4,39-3-4, subd. C. 
2. Criminal Law c=> 1129(3) 
Where defendant, who was convicted 
of battery upon a police officer, failed to 
include issue whether he was entitled to 
instruction on lesser included offense of 
simple battery in docketing statement, issue 
was not before the Court of Appeals for 
review. Rules of Criminal Appellate Proce-
dure, Rule 501(a)(2). 
3. Arrest c=>63.1 
Where police officer was conducting an 
investigation of reported disturbance in 
routine manner and in lawful discharge of 
his duties, detention of defendant was not 
illegal. U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 4. 
4. Automobiles c=>349 
Where defendant, who was convicted 
of battery upon a police officer, had driven 
car several feet in arresting officer's pres-
ence before he was arrested, and officer 
had smelled alcohol and noted defendant's 
slurred speech, there was no lack of proba-
ble cause to arrest U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 
4. 
Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Michael EL 
Sanchez, Asst Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for 
plaintiff-appellee. 
Thomas B. Root, Albuquerque, for de-
fendant-appellant 
OPINION 
WALTERS, Judge. 
The defendant was convicted of battery 
upon a police officer. On appeal, his appel-
late counsel (who did not represent Hernan-
dez at trial and did not prepare the docket-
ing statement see N.M.R.CrimA.pp.P. 
205(b), N.M.SA.1978) argues four points for 
reversal. Each is considered below, and 
rejected. 
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court which has validly acquired jurisdic-
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Jerry tion in a specific case before the enactment 
M. KNUDSEN, deceased, Burleigh generally does not lose that jurisdiction on 
County Probate No. 3107 Appeals from the effective date of the statute unless loss 
Order entered January 26, 1981. of jurisdiction is clearly expressed. 
Dann G. KNUDSEN and Eric J. Knudsen, 
as personal representatives of the estate 
of Jerry M. Knudsen, deceased; and 
Dann G. Knudsen, Eric J. Knudsen and 
Jeffrey Knudsen, Appellees, 
v. 
Susan F. KNUDSEN, one of the heirs at 
law of Jerry M. Knudsen, 
deceased, Appellant 
Civ. No. 10427. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
Jan. 4, 1984 
Wife of the deceased was decreed by 
the probate court to be an omitted spouse 
entitled to an intestate share and, on appeal 
to the District Court of Burleigh County, 
South Central Judicial District, Eugene A. 
Burdick, Surrogate Judge, a trial de novo 
to a jury resulted in a special verdict that 
transfers of property to the wife outside 
the will were intended by the deceased to 
be in lieu of a testamentary provision for 
her. After remand, 322 N.W.2d 454, the 
Supreme Court, Pederson, J., held that life 
insurance benefits and joint tenancy prop-
erties provided by deceased for his wife 
Were "transfers" within statute governing 
8hare of an omitted spouse and, hence, 
Were properly made a basis for conclusion 
«at wife was not entitled to receive same 
share of estate she would have received if 
deceased left no will because deceased in-
tended to provide for wife outside of his 
f^fl when he named her beneficiary on his 
™e insurance policies and joint tenant on 
several items of property. 
Affirmed. 
*• Courts <£=»30 
As a general rule where there has 
"^n a statutory change of jurisdiction, the 
2. Courts <s=>30 
Assuming that the district court by 
statutory enactment lost jurisdiction over 
an appeal taken from the county probate 
court after January 1, 1983, where the ap-
peal in the particular case was taken prior 
to that date, the district court was not 
without subject-matter jurisdiction in the 
particular case and its judgment, though 
entered in a trial de novo after that date, 
was not void since the newly enacted stat-
ute did not mention a case pending on 
appeal to district court and thus it was to 
be presumed that there was no legislative 
intent to strip the district court of its juris-
diction of an appeal perfected before the 
date in question. NDCC 27-05-06, subd. 4, 
30.1-02-02, subd. 2; NDCC 30-26-01 et 
seq. (Repealed). 
3. Statutes <©=>223.1 
Where there is doubt as to the mean-
ing of a word in a statute, courts may 
properly refer to cognate or related legisla-
tion to determine the sense in which the 
word was employed in the statute. 
4. Statutes <s=205, 208 
The meaning of a word in a given 
sentence or clause of a statute may be 
affected not only by the context, but also 
by the subject to which it is applied. 
5. Wills <3=>535 
The word "transfers," within statute 
requiring that an omitted spouse receive 
the same share of the estate she would 
have received if the deceased left no will 
unless it appears from the will that the 
omission was intentional or the deceased 
provided for the spouse by transfers out-
side the will, was meant to include life 
insurance payable to a spouse and joint 
tenancy property with a right of survivor-
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ship. NDCC 30.1-06-01, 30.1-06-01, subd. 
1. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
6. Wills <3=>535 
Life insurance benefits and joint tenan-
cy properties provided by deceased for his 
wife were "transfers" within statute gov-
erning share of an omitted spouse and, 
hence, were properly made a basis for con-
clusion that wife was not entitled to receive 
same share of estate she would have re-
ceived if deceased left no will because de-
ceased intended to provide for wife outside 
of his will when he named her beneficiary 
on his life insurance policies and joint ten-
ant on several items of property. NDCC 
30.1-06-01, 30.1-06-01, subd. 1. 
7. Wills <3=>535 
A trier of fact may determine from the 
amount of the transfers alone whether or 
not the deceased intended that the trans-
fers to a spouse outside of the will be in 
lieu of a testamentary provision. NDCC 
30.1-05-01, 30.1-06-01, subd. 1. 
8. Appeal and Error <s=*989, 994(2) 
On appeal from a judgment entered 
upon a verdict, the Supreme Court will not 
invade the province of the jury to weigh 
evidence or to determine the credibility of 
witnesses. 
9. Appeal and Error e=>930(l), 1001(1) 
In reviewing the evidence on appeal 
from a judgment entered upon a verdict, 
the Supreme Court will view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
and, if there is substantial evidence to sup-
port the verdict, will not set that verdict 
aside. 
10. Wills <s=»704 
Whether deceased's wife received, as a 
beneficiary of several life insurance policies 
and as a survivor in several joint tenancy 
properties, a total of more than $437,000 
was a question of fact for jury in determin-
ing amount of transfers made by deceased 
to his wife in lieu of testamentary provi-
sions. NDCC 30.1-05-01, 30.1-06-01, 
subd. 1. 
11. Trial <3>213, 266 
A trial court need not give instructions 
in the specific language requested by a 
litigant; instructions which fairly inform 
the jury of the applicable law are all that is 
required. 
12. Appeal and Error <s=1026 
No error in either the admission or 
exclusion of evidence and no error or de-
fect in any ruling or anything done or 
omitted by the trial court or by any of the 
parties is a ground for setting aside a 
verdict unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the Supreme Court to be incon-
sistent with substantial justice. 
E.J. Rose, Bismarck, for appellees; ar-
gued by E J. Rose. 
Mills & Moore, Bismarck, for appellant; 
argued by William R Mills, Bismarck. 
PEDERSON, Justice. 
Susan F. Knudsen was decreed by the 
probate court to be an omitted spouse enti-
tled to an intestate share in the estate of 
her late husband, !.!. Knudsen. On 
appeal to the district court, a trial de novo 
to a jury resulted in a special verdict that 
transfers of property to Susan outside the 
will were intended by Jerry to be in lieu of 
a testamentary provision for her. Susan 
appealed from the judgment entered upon 
the verdict We affirm. 
In 1962, Jerry executed his only will de-
vising his entire estate to his wife at the 
time, Lela Margaret Knudsen. The will 
provided that in the event Lela predeceased 
Jerry, or if they died simultaneously, the 
entire estate would pass to Jerry and Lela's 
sons, Jeffrey, Dann, and Eric. In 1975, 
Jerry divorced Lela and married Susan but 
never changed or supplemented his 1962 
will. In 1979, while married to Susan, Jer-
ry died in a hunting-boating accident 
Susan was the named beneficiary in sev-
eral life insurance policies and she was'a 
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joint owner with*Jerry of several items of 
property. 
This is the second time that the question, 
whether or not Jerry intended to provide 
for Susan outside of his will when he 
named her beneficiary on his life insurance 
policies and joint tenant on several items of 
property, has been before this court We 
held previously that a mere showing that 
the amount of the benefits provided Susan 
ouHde of the will exceeded one-third of the 
augmented estate, did not warrant a con-
clusion, as a matter of law, that Jerry 
intended those benefits to be in lieu of any 
testamentary provision for Susan. We re-
minded-the case to the district court for 
trial de novo with a jury. See Matter of 
Estate ofKnudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 
1982). 
At the conclusion of the trial after re-
mand, the jury answered affirmatively the 
following Special Verdict question: "Did 
Jerry intend one or more of the transfers 
of property made to Susan outside the Will 
to be in lieu of making any testamentary 
provision for her?" 
JURISDICTION 
Before reaching the merits, we first con-
sider Susan's claim that the judgment en-
tered by the district court is void because 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
At the time these proceedings were com-
menced, district courts clearly had jurisdic-
tion over appeals from probate courts pur-
suant to §§ 27-05-06(4) and 30.1-02-02(2), 
NDCC, and Chapter 30-26, NDCC. Chap-
ter 30-26 was repealed and §§ 27-05-06(4) 
and 30.1-02-02(2) were amended effective 
January 1, 1983. See § 51, Ch. 319, S.L. 
1981; § 51, Ch. 320, S.L.1981; § 64, Ch. 82, 
S.L.1983; § 2, Ch. 352, S.L.1983. Although 
* may be otherwise argued, we will pre-
sume for the purposes of this case that 
district courts generally, on January 1, 
1983, lost jurisdiction over appeals taken 
after that date from county probate courts. 
*• Accord Berg v. Traeger, 210 Cal. 323, 325-326, 
292 P. 495, 496 (1930); Willen v. Boggs, 21 
CaUppJd 520, 522 n. 1, 97 Cal.Rptr. 917, 918 n. 
When this case was here before, we not-
ed that under the constitution, appellate 
jurisdiction of the district court may be 
provided by law or by rule of the Supreme 
Court If direct appeals from probate 
courts to this court create the nightmare 
that has been predicted, this court has the 
power, apparently, to restore all probate 
appeals to the district court See Matter of 
Estate of Knudsen, supra, 322 N.W.2d at 
456. 
The appeal to the district court in this 
case was taken in 1981. The trial was not 
held and the judgment was not entered by 
the district court until February 1983. Su-
san argues that after January 1, 1983, the 
district court had no power other than to 
remand the case to the Burleigh County 
Court We do not agree. 
In Staehling v. Schneider, 545 S.W.2d 
273, 274 (Tex.Civ.App.1976), a case which is 
in many respects similar to this case, the 
court stated: 
"Generally, where a right of action or 
a remedy is derived from a statute which 
is subsequently repealed, and the repeal-
ing statute contains no savings clause in 
favor of pending suits, the right of action 
or remedy is lost unless relief has been 
granted before the effective date of the 
repeal 
"Where, however, the right of appeal 
has become perfected upon performance 
of the specified statutory requirements, 
the court of review retains jurisdiction 
over the appeal unless the repealing stat-
ute indicates a contrary legislative in-
tent" 
[1,2] It can be stated as a general rule 
that where there has been a statutory 
change of jurisdiction, the court which had 
validly acquired jurisdiction in a specific 
case before the enactment, generally does 
not lose that jurisdiction on the effective 
date of the statute unless loss of jurisdic-
tion is clearly expressed. See 20 Am. 
Jur.2d Courts § 150 (1965); 21 CJ.S. 
Courts § 92 (1940).1 Because the legisla-
1 (1971); Atkins v. Rayburn, 506 S.W^d 208, 
209 (Tex. 1974); Cluck v. Ballenger, 543 S.W.2d 
159, 161 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976). 
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ture did not mention cases pending on ap-
peal to the district courts, it is deemed that 
there was no legislative intent to strip the 
district courts of jurisdiction of probate 
court appeals which had been perfected 
before January 1, 1983. 
The district court had subject matter jur-
isdiction to try the instant case and to enter 
judgment thereon. 
MERITS 
Susan argues that the trial court erred in 
its jury instruction regarding "transfers" 
under § 30.1-06-01(1)(2-301), NDCC, which 
provides: 
"30.1-06-01(2-301). Omitted spouse — 
1. If a testator fails to provide by will 
for his surviving spouse who married the 
testator after the execution of the will, 
the omitted spouse shall receive the same 
share of the estate he would have re-
ceived if the decedent left no will unless 
it appears from the will that the omission 
was intentional or the testator provided 
for the spouse by transfer outside the 
will and the intent that the transfer be in 
lieu of a testamentary provision is shown 
by statements of the testator or from the 
amount of the transfer or other evi-
dence." 
The trial court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
"(5) That Jerry made a number of 
transfers outside his Will to Susan. As 
beneficiary named by Jerry in several 
life insurance policies, she received the 
proceeds of the policies payable on his 
death. As surviving joint owner, she 
became on his death sole owner of sever-
al joint bank accounts. As surviving 
joint-tenant, she became on his death sole 
owner of other properties held by Jerry 
and her in joint-tenancy." 
Susan argues that the trial court erred 
because life insurance benefits and joint 
tenancy properties are not "transfers" 
within the purview of § 30.1-06-01(2-301), 
NDCC. 
[3,4] The word "transfer" is not 
defined in Title 30.1, NDCC. Where there 
is doubt as to the meaning of a word in a 
statute, courts may properly "refer to cog-
nate or related legislation to determine the 
sense in which the word was employed" in 
the statute. Syllabus by the court in Gra-
bow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 215, 229 N.W. 
282, 283 (1930). See also Thielen v. Koste-
lecky, 69 N.D. 410, 416, 287 N.W. 513, 516 
(1939) ["The meaning of a word in a given 
sentence or clause may be affected not 
only by the context, but also by the subject 
to which it is applied."] 
Although the Editorial Board Comment 
to § 30.1-06-01(2-301), NDCC, makes no 
mention of life insurance benefits and joint 
tenancy properties as constituting "trans-
fers" for purposes of the statute, the Com-
ment states that "[t]he effect of this sec-
tion should be to reduce the number of 
instances where a spouse will claim an 
elective share." As pointed out by Justice 
Sand in his specially concurring opinion in 
Matter of Estate of Knudsen, supra, un-
der § 30.1-05-02(2-202), NDCC, the aug-
mented estate statute, the Editorial Board 
Comment states that "life insurance pro-
ceeds payable to the surviving spouse are 
included in the second category [of trans-
fers to other persons], because it seems 
unfair to allow a surviving spouse to dis-
turb the decedents estate plan if the 
spouse has received ample provision from 
life insurance." The Editorial Board Com-
ment to the pretermitted children statute, 
§ 30.1-06-02(2-302), NDCC, which contains 
language similar to that used in the omit-
ted spouse section, also speaks of "nonpro-
bate transfers such as life insurance or 
joint accounts " 
We are also directed by § 30.1-01-
02(1)(1-102), NDCC, to construe Title 30.1 
"to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies." One of the purposes and policies 
of Title 30.1 is "[t]o make uniform the law 
among the various jurisdictions." § 30.1-
01-02(2)(e)(l-102), NDCC. The Uniform 
Probate Code Practice Manual provides 
some illumination on the intended effect of 
the omitted spouse statute: 
"The provisions of Part 3 of Article II 
are intended to protect the spouse and 
MATTER OF ESTATE OF KNUDSEN N. D. 391 
Cite as 342 K.VlJ2d 387 (N.D. 1984) 
enumerated situations that through its adoption of the Uniform children in the 
only if the omission was unintentional. 
Hence, the Code permits, within certain 
limits, evidence to establish whether the 
testator would have wanted a share for 
the spouse or child. In the case of a 
spouse married after the execution of the 
will, it must appear from the will that the 
omission was intentional or that the tes-
tator may have provided for the spouse 
by transfer outside the will, such as life 
insurance or joint tenancy arrange-
ments. In such cases the intent of the 
testator that these transfers be in lieu of 
a testamentary provision may be shown 
by evidence of the testator's statements 
or the amount of the transfer, or other 
evidence—" [Emphasis added.] 1 
Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual 
115 (2d ed. 1977). 
We also note that courts in Arizona and 
New Mexico, jurisdictions which have also 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code, have 
recognized that life insurance payable to a 
spouse and joint tenancy property with a 
right of survivorship can be included as 
"transfers" within the meaning of the omit-
ted spouse section. See Matter of Estate 
of Beaman, 119 Ariz. 614, 617-618, 583 
PJ2d 270, 273-274 (CtApp.1978); Matter of 
Estate of Taggart, 95 N.M. 117, 123-124, 
619 P.2d 562, 568-569 (CtApp.1980). See 
also Annot, 11 A.L.R. 4th 1213 (1982). 
[5,6] We conclude that life insurance 
benefits and joint tenancy arrangements 
constitute "transfers" for the purposes of 
the omitted spouse statute.2 It is evident 
2. The court in Taggart, supra, appears to have 
taken the position that whether or not a "trans-
fer" itself has occurred within the context of the 
omitted spouse section, at least with regard to 
joint tenancy properties, is a question properly 
left to the jury and distinct from the question 
whether or not the "transfer" was intended to be 
in lieu of a testamentary provision. The court 
explained that "[i]f [the surviving spouse] was 
merely given access to those funds to provide a 
convenient method for managing the couple's 
expenses, it was not a transfer to her." Taggart, 
supra, 95 N.M. at 123-124, 619 P.2d at 568-569. 
We do not believe that such a fine distinction 
between a "transfer" and the intent that the 
"transfer* be in lieu of a testamentary provision 
<»'J fnr- tk<» t l i r v ' c r?**f«« 
Probate Code, the legislature did not intend 
the literal definition of "transfer" found in 
§ 47-09-01, NDCC, to apply to Title 30.1. 
Nor do §§ 47-10-23.1 and 47-11-16, 
NDCC, affect our conclusion. It appears 
these statutes were enacted "for purposes 
of chapter 57-37.1" which relates to estate 
taxes. See § 3, CK 483, S.L.1979. We 
note that "the objectives of a tax law are 
different from those involved . . . in the 
Probate Code...." §30.1-05-02(2-202), 
NDCC, Editorial Board Comment The tri-
al court's instruction was not erroneous. 
Susan also contends that the district 
court erred in instructing the jury that the 
amount of the transfers alone could be the 
basis for determining if Jerry intended the 
transfers to be in lieu of a testamentary 
provision. After essentially tracking the 
statutory language of § 30.1-06-01(1)(2-
301), NDCC, the district court instructed 
the jury as follows: 
"In this case, there is nothing in Jer-
ry's will that indicates that the omission 
of Susan was intentional. The Petition-
ers contend rather that Susan does not 
qualify for an intestate share under the 
foregoing provision of the law for the 
reason that Jerry provided for her by 
transfers of property outside the will and 
that his intent that the transfers be in 
lieu of a testamentary provision is 
shown, not by statements of Jerry, but 
from the amount of the transfers or oth-
er evidence. This contention of the Peti-
tioners is refuted by Susan, thus present-
mination. A litigant's contention, and a jury's 
determination, that a spouse was given access to 
joint tenancy funds in order to provide a conve-
nient method for managing a couple's expenses 
seems to us to be more appropriately dealt with 
in regard to the intent that a "transfer" was in 
lieu of a testamentary provision rather than in 
regard to whether or not a "transfer" has in fact 
occurred. 
We conclude that the trial court properly in-
structed the jury that the life insurance benefits 
and joint tenancy properties were in fact "trans-
fers" outside the will as a matter of law, while 
leaving for the jury the ultimate determination 
of whether or not it can be determined from the 
amount alone that the transfers were intended 
to be in lieu of a testamentary provision. 
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ing the issue of Jerry's intent for your 
determination. 
• * * # • • 
"It is for the }\iry to determine whether 
the amount of property transferred in 
this case is sufficient to give rise to the 
inference that Jerry intended one or 
more of the transfers to be in lieu of 
making any testamentary provision for 
Susan." 
[7] In the previous appeal, this court 
held that the district court erred in conclud-
ing on summary judgment that the intent 
that a transfer to a spouse outside of the 
will is in lieu of a testamentary provision 
can be shown as a matter of law by an 
amount which exceeds one-third of the aug-
mented estate pursuant to § 30.1-05-01(2-
201), NDCC. Matter of Estate of Knud-
sen, supra. We did not hold that a trier of 
fact cannot determine from the amount of 
the transfers alone whether or not the de-
cedent intended that the transfers be in 
Yieu of a testamentary provision. Section 
30.1-06-01(1)(2-301), NDCC, specifically 
provides that this intent may be shown 
"from the amount of the transfer or other 
evidence." The trial court properly in-
structed the jury in this regard. 
In a related contention, Susan argues 
that the evidence was insufficient to sus-
tain the jury's verdict Jeffrey, Dann, and 
Eric introduced evidence that Susan re-
ceived, as the beneficiary of several life 
insurance policies3 and as the survivor in 
several joint tenancy properties, a total of 
more than $437,000. The sons also esti-
mated the total net worth of Jerry's estate 
to be approximately $80,000, an amount 
which Susan disputed. Susan also intro-
duced testimony indicating that Jerry did 
3. One of these life insurance policies was in-
volved in the recent case of McCarney v. Knud-
sen, 342 N W.2d 380 (N.D.1983). In McCarney, 
we held that the sons did not establish by clear 
and convincing evidence an implied trust re-
quiring Susan to use $130,000 in proceeds from 
a life insurance policy to satisfy a debt of the 
estate. The jury in the instant case was made 
aware that the proceeds from this insurance 
policy were the subject of litigation in another 
action. The possible anomaly in trying these 
not intend these life insurance policies and 
joint tenancy properties to be in lieu of a 
testamentary provision. 
1&-2W Ttiis court wffi not invade the 
province of the jury to weigh evidence or to 
determine the credibility of witnesses. 
Powers v. Martinson, 313 N.W.2d 720, 728 
(N.D.1981). In reviewing the evidence, we 
view it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict and if there is substantial evidence* 
to support the verdict, we will not set it 
aside. Powers, supra. We conclude that 
there was substantial evidence to support 
the jury's verdict 
Susan has also attacked several other 
jury instructions and trial court rulings on 
the admission and exclusion of evidence 
during the trial. She cites no authority to 
support her contentions and thus it is diffi-
cult to ascertain the bases for her argu-
ments. 
[11,12] In any event, a trial court need 
not give instructions in the specific lan-
guage requested by a litigant Instruc-
tions which fairly inform the jury of the 
applicable law are all that is required. 
State v. Dacktler, 318 N.W.2d 769, 774 
(N.D.1982); South v. National R.R. Pas-
senger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819^ o2tHt&> 
(N.D.1980). This court has also held that 
no error in either the admission or exclu-
sion of evidence and no error or defect in 
any ruling or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties is 
ground for setting aside a verdict "unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the 
court to be inconsistent with substantial 
justice." Syllabus by the court in Intle-
house v. Rose, 153 N.W.2d 810, 812 (N.D. 
1967). Counsel has pointed to nothing 
actions separately was pointed out in McCarney, 
supra, 342 N.W.2d at 381 n. 1. 
We also note that this life insurance policy 
was nominally taken out by Jerry's professional 
corporation. Susan has not argued that because 
the policy was taken out in the name of the 
corporation, it did not constitute a transfer by 
the testator, and we therefore do not decide the 
issue today. 
PETITION OF 
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which occurred during the trial that re-
quires us to disturb the jury's verdict 
The judgment is affirmed. 
VANDE WALLE, Acting C J , GIERKE 
and SAND, JJ., and ILVEDSON, Surrogate 
Judge, concur. 
ILVEDSON, Surrogate Judge, sitting in 
place of ERICKSTAD, CJ., disqualified. 
fEM> 
In the Matter of the Petition of David 
C. THOMPSON for Review of a Deter-
mination of the State Bar Board. 
Civ. No. 10462. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
Dec. 22, 1983. 
Applicant for admission to the Bar pe-
titioned to review a negative recommenda-
tion of the State Bar Board. The Supreme 
Court held that the application would be 
granted, notwithstanding the Board's nega-
tive recommendation based on applicant's 
failure by three points to achieve minimum 
scale score on multi-State Bar exammation 
segment 
Application granted. 
Opinions of the Court to grant applica-
tion were filed by Enckstad, CJ.f Peder-
son, VandeWalle and Gierke, JJ. 
Sand, J., voted nay and filed opinion. 
Attorney and Client ®=>1 
Application for admission to Bar would 
** approved notwithstanding State Bar 
Board's negative recommendation based on 
aPplicant's failure by three points to 
*• The Admission to Practice Rules applicable to 
this case are those m effect prior to the amend-
THOMPSON N. D. 3 9 3 
393 (NJ). 1983) 
achieve minimum scale score on the multi-
State Bar examination segment, where ap-
plicant had above average scores on other 
portions of examination, applicant made 
showing that he was more severely affect-
ed by disturbing noises than other exami-
nees and* Board's hearing officer indicated 
that applicant was qualified. Admission to 
Practice Rules 1, 3 (1982); NDCC 27-11-19; 
Const. Ar t 6, § 3. 
Chapman & Chapman, Bismarck, for 
Thompson; argued by Daniel J. Chapman, 
Bismarck, and David C. Thompson, pro se. 
Lundberg, Conmy, Nodland, Lucas & 
Schulz, Bismarck, for State Bar Bd.; ar-
gued by Irvin B. Nodland, Bismarck. 
ORDER 
Opinions of the Court to grant Applica-
tion for Admission to the Bar were filed on 
December 22, 1983, by the Honorable 
Ralph J. Erickstad, Chief Justice; the Hon-
orable Vernon R. Pederson, the Honorable 
Gerald W. VandeWalle, the Honorable H.F. 
Gierke, III, Justices. An opinion to deny 
the Application was filed by the Honorable 
Paul M. Sand, Justice. 
ORDERED, that a Certificate of Admis-
sion to the Bar be issued to David C. 
Thompson in accordance with the opinions 
filed and upon his taking the required Oath 
and Pledge. 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota con-
vened at 11 a.m. this 22nd day of Decem-
ber, 1983, with the Honorable Ralph J. 
Erickstad, Chief Justice; the Honorable 
Paul M. Sand, the Honorable Vernon R. 
Pederson, the Honorable Gerald W. Vande-
Walle, the Honorable H.F. Gierke, III, Jus-
tices; and Luella Dunn, Clerk, being 
present, and directed the entry of the 
above Order with Justice Sand voting nay. 
SAND, Justice. 
David C. Thompson has petitioned this 
Court, pursuant to Rule 1(d)(3), of the Ad-
mission to Practice Rules 1 to review a neg-
ments of July 1, 1983. 
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mation itself, but claims that the testimony 
given at the preliminary hearing is insuffi-
cient to support a felony charge of escape. 
The district court obviously dismissed the 
charge because it concluded that O'Boyle's 
conduct did not constitute a violation of the 
Gass C felony portion of the statute 
charged. The dismissal was in effect a 
premature determination of the question of 
guilt or innocence made before the submis-
sion of any evidence. 
We conclude that the issue raised in 
O'Boyle's motion to dismiss was not capa-
ble of determination without the trial of the 
general issue, because it was the general 
issue. The district court had no jurisdic-
tion to decide O'Boyle's guilt or innocence 
as a matter of law from evidence elicited at 
the preliminary hearing. See United 
States v. King, 581 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 
1978). 
Even assuming that the evidence at trial 
is the same as that shown in the preliminary 
hearing transcript, the exact point at which 
O'Boyle's conduct became an accomplished 
"escape" cannot be determined as a matter 
of law. It was error for the trial court to 
conclude, without hearing any evidence, 
that the escape was "completed" when 
O'Boyle exited the vehicle and prior to the 
time that a struggle occurred about two 
hundred feet from the location of the vehi-
cle. When the case is tried, issues relating 
to lesser included offenses will likely arise. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, 
O'Boyle's motion to dismiss the appeal is 
denied, the order dismissing the informa-
tion is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
ERICKSTAD, CJ., and SAND and 
GIERKE, JJ., concur. 
VANDE WALLE, Justice, dissenting. 
I do not agree that we can conclude the 
Memorandum decision is intended to be a 
™al order, thereby applying the statement 
& State v. Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d 302, 304, n. 
1
 (N.D.1982), that "when the memorandum 
Opinion contains an order which was intend-
^ to be a final order and the order is one 
ant to statute, we will treat the appeal as 
an appeal from the order." 
Here, the concluding paragraph of the 
memorandum opinion from which the in-
stant appeal is taken states, in part: 
"Based on the foregoing, it is hereby 
ordered that the Information charging 
the defendant with the Class C felony of 
escape is hereby dismissed. Counsel for 
the defendant may prepare the appro-
priate order of dismissal" [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
Furthermore, as the majority opinion notes, 
an order of dismissal, from which no appeal 
was taken, was subsequently entered. The 
facts of this case thus are more akin to 
those in State v. Tinsley, 325 N.W.2d 177 
(N.D.1982), in which a memorandum opin-
ion containing the ruling of the trial court 
was issued on February 10, 1982, followed 
by an order dismissing Tinsley's application 
for post-conviction relief on February 26, 
1982. We held that under those circum-
stances the memorandum opinion did not 
contain an appealable final order and we 
dismissed the appeal. 
Here, I can only conclude from the quot-
ed wording of the memorandum opinion 
that the memorandum opinion was not in-
tended to be a final order and I would 
dismiss the appeal because it is from a 
memorandum opinion which is not appeala-
ble. 
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Elsie 
FRANDSON, Deceased. 
Clarence SCHOTT, Petitioner 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Louis FRANDSON, Respondent 
and Appellant 
Civ. No. 10628. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
Oct 23, 1984. 
Surviving spouse appealed from judg-
fr°*n which an appeal may be taken pursu- ment entered bv the Cass County Court, 
126 N.D. 356 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
East Centra] Judicial District, Donald J. 
Cooke, J., which decreed that he was not an 
omitted spouse under statute. The Su-
preme Court, Sand, J., held that trial 
court's finding that deceased spouse pro-
vided for surviving spouse by transfers 
outside will with intent that transfers be in 
lieu of a testamentary provision was not 
clearly erroneous, and thus surviving 
spouse was not an omitted spouse under 
statute. 
Affirmed. 
1. Wills <s=*706, 782(11) 
Trial court's finding that deceased 
spouse provided for surviving spouse by 
transfers outside will with intent that 
transfers be in lieu of a testamentary pro-
vision was not clearly erroneous, and thus 
surviving spouse was not an omitted 
spouse. NDCC 30.1-06-01, subd. 1. 
2. Joint Tenancy <s=>3 
Wills <e=»782(ll) 
Statute governing accounts and trans-
fers nontestamentary simply provides that 
the validity of a joint account with a right 
of survivorship is not to be determined by 
requirements for wills, and does not pre-
clude consideration of joint bank account 
and certificates of deposit as transfers for 
purposes of omitted spouse statute. 
NDCC 30.1-06-01, subd. 1, 30.1-31-06. 
3. Judgment <3=>180, 183 
Trial court in suit determining whether 
surviving spouse was an omitted spouse 
did not err in not granting surviving 
spouse's motion for summary judgment 
made during trial on ground that burden 
was incorrectly placed upon him to show 
that deceased spouse did not provide for 
him by transfers outside will because es-
tate submitted no evidence at hearing, but 
limited itself to cross-examination of sur-
viving spouse, in that surviving spouse did 
not give notice of motion at least ten days 
prior to time fixed for hearing and, regard-
less of who had burden of proof, trial court 
would have been required to make a find-
ing of fact regarding deceased spouses's 
intent as a matter of law based solely on 
parties' stipulation which would have been 
improper in a summary judgment proceed-
ing. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
Holand, Gray, Lochow & Sortland, Far-
go, for petitioner and appellee; argued by 
Donald C. Holand, Fargo. 
Overboe & Cuffe, West Fargo, for re-
spondent and appellant; argued by James 
R. Britton, Fargo. 
SAND, Justice. 
Louis Frandson appealed from a county 
court judgment which decreed that he is 
not an omitted spouse under § 30.1-06-
01(2-301), N.D.C.C. We affirm. 
Louis Frandson married Elsie Frandson 
on 10 September 1978. Louis was 68 years 
old and Elsie was 67 years old on the date 
of the wedding, and both had been married 
to other persons once before. Louis and 
Elsie brought into the new marriage sepa-
rate property. 
According to Louis, during the first year 
of their marriage Elsie suggested that they 
have wills prepared. The couple went to 
an attorney and Louis executed a will be-
queathing all of his property to Elsie. El-
sie, however, died on 19 June 1981 without 
executing a new will. A will executed by 
Elsie, on 3 June 1975 before her marriage 
to Louis, was admitted to probate. The 
will obviously did not contain a provision 
for Louis nor was any reason given why 
Louis should have been provided for in the 
1975 wilL 
Louis subsequently sought his intestate 
share of Elsie's estate as an omitted 
spouse. Counsel for the personal repre-
sentative and counsel for Louis entered 
into a stipulation listing the face values and 
date of death values of property owned 
solely by Elsie and property owned jointly 
by Elsie and Louis. During the trial, addi-
tional items of Elsie's solely owned proper-
ty were entered in evidence. Elsie's solely 
owned property included farmland, a bank 
account, and several certificates of deposit 
The date of death value of Elsie's solely 
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owned property was more than $94,000. 
The property owned jointly by Elsie and 
Louis included their residence in West Far-
go, an automobile, household appliances 
and furnishings, and several bank accounts 
and certificates of deposit The date of 
death value of the property held in joint 
tenancy by Elsie and Louis totaled more 
than $136,000. The evidence established 
that Elsie's contributions to the jointly 
owned property were approximately $81,-
000 and that Louis' contributions were ap-
proximately $55,000. 
The county court determined that Elsie, 
by her placement of property in joint tenan-
cy, had provided for Louis by transfers 
outside the will with the intent that the 
transfers be in lieu of a testamentary pro-
vision pursuant to § 30.1-06-01 (2-301), 
N.D.C.C. Judgment was entered decreeing 
that Louis was not an omitted spouse, and 
Louis has appealed. 
Louis essentially contended on appeal: 
(1) that the county court erred in determin-
ing that he was not an omitted spouse; and 
(2) that the trial court erred in not granting 
his motion for summary judgment made 
during the trial. 
Section 30.1-06-01(1) (2-301), N.D.C.C., 
provides: 
"30.1-Ofc-Ol (2-301). Omitted spouse. 
—1. If a testator fails to provide by will 
for his surviving spouse who married the 
testator after the execution of the will, 
the omitted spouse shall receive the same 
share of the estate he would have re-
ceived if the decedent left no will unless 
it appears from the will that the omission 
was intentional or the testator provided 
for the spouse by transfer outside the 
will and the intent that the transfer be in 
lieu of a testamentary provision is shown 
by statements of the testator or from the 
amount of the transfer or other evi-
dence." 
This Court has construed the provisions 
of the omitted spouse statute on two previ-
ous occasions. In Matter of Estate of 
Knudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454 (N.D.1982) 
[Knudsen / ] , we held a mere showing that 
the amount of benefits provided to a sur-
viving spouse in the form of life insurance 
benefits and joint tenancy properties ex-
ceeded one-third of the augmented estate 
did not warrant a conclusion, as a matter of 
law, that the decedent intended those bene-
fits to be in lieu of a testamentary provi-
sion for the surviving spouse. We re-
versed a summary judgment entered in fa-
vor of the personal representatives and re-
manded the case for trial. On remand, the 
jury returned a verdict finding that the 
transfers of property to the surviving 
spouse outside the will were intended by 
the decedent to be in lieu of a testamentary 
provision. The surviving spouse appealed, 
asserting in part that the trial court erred 
in instructing the jury that the amount of 
the transfers alone could be the basis for 
determining if the decedent intended the 
transfers to be in lieu of a testamentary 
provision. We affirmed the judgment in 
Matter of Estate of Knudsen, 342 N.W.2d 
387, 392 (N.D.1984) [Knudsen II\ stating: 
"We did not hold [in Knudsen I] that a 
trier of fact cannot determine from the 
amount of the transfers alone whether or 
not the decedent intended that the trans-
fers be in lieu of a testamentary provi-
sion. Section 30.1-06-01(1) (2-301), 
NDCC, specifically provides that this in-
tent may be shown 'from the amount of 
the transfer or other evidence.' The trial 
court properly instructed the jury in this 
regard." 
In this case, Louis similarly asserts that 
there is "no evidence" in the record upon 
which the county court could base its deter-
mination that he does not qualify as an 
omitted spouse. We disagree. 
[1] The evidence reveals that Elsie and 
Louis were married for a relatively short 
period of time. Although Louis had a will 
prepared early in the marriage, Elsie never 
did return to the attorney's office to exe-
cute a new will. The evidence reflects that 
Elsie, during the marriage, consciously re-
tained certain assets in her own name. 
Louis received from Elsie a substantial por-
tion of her estate by her placement of 
property into joint tenancy. Of the $136,-
000 value of the property held in joint 
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tenancy, Elsie contributed $81,000. Elsie's 
contribution to the joint tenancy property 
was almost as much as the amount she 
retained for disposition by will. Having 
carefully reviewed the record, we cannot 
say the trial court's finding that Elsie pro-
vided for Louis by transfers outside the 
will with the intent that the transfers be in 
lieu of a testamentary provision is clearly 
erroneous. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. 
We note that a substantial amount of the 
joint tenancy properties in this case consist-
ed of joint bank accounts and certificates 
of deposit Although neither party has 
raised as an issue the possible application 
of § 30.1-31-06 (6-106), N.D.C.C, to this 
case, we deem it appropriate to point out 
that this statute does not dictate a differ-
ent result 
Section 30.1-31-06 (6-106), N.D.C.C, pro-
vides: 
"20.1-31-Q6. (6-106) Accounts and 
transfers nontestamentary. Any trans-
fers resulting from the application of sec-
tion 30.1-31-04 are effective by reason of 
the account contracts involved and this 
statute and are not to be considered as 
testamentary or subject to chapters 30.1-
01 through 30.1-25, except as provided in 
sections 30.1-05-01 through 30.1-05-07, 
and except as a consequence of, and to 
the extent directed by, section 30.1-31-
07." 
Although this statute is far from a model 
of clarity, its purpose and intent are suc-
cinctly stated in the Editorial Board Com-
ment to the section: 
"The purpose of classifying the trans-
actions contemplated by chapter 30.1-31 
as nontestamentary is to bolster the ex-
plicit statement that their validity as ef-
fective modes of transfers at death is not 
to be determined by the requirements for 
1. We have discovered no case law from other 
Uniform Probate Code jurisdictions interpreting 
U.P.C. § 6-106 in conjunction with the omitted 
spouse statute. However, courts in Arizona and 
New Mexico appear to have recognized that 
joint bank accounts can be considered as trans-
fers for purposes of the omitted spouse statute, 
but have made no mention of U.P.C. § 6-106. 
wills. The section is consistent with sec-
tion 30.1-31-14." 
The Editorial Board Comment to-§ 30.1-
31-14 (6-201), N.D.C.C, which is entitled 
''Provisions for payment or transfer at 
death," states in part: 
"Because the types of provisions de-
scribed in the statute are characterized 
as nontestamentary, the instrument does 
not have to be executed in compliance 
with section 30.1-08-02; nor does it have 
to be probated; nor does the personal 
representative have any power or duty 
with respect to the assets involved." 
We also note that the Editorial Board Com-
ment to the pretermitted children statute, 
§ 30.1-06-02 (2-302), N.D.C.C, states that 
oral evidence is allowed "to establish a 
testator's intent that . . . nonprobate trans-
fers such as life insurance or joint ac-
counts are in lieu of a testamentary provi-
sion " [Emphasis added.] 
[2] Construing § 30.1-31-06 (6-106), 
JV.D.C.C, "with a view to effecting its ob-
j^cts and to promoting justice" [§ 1-02-01, 
N.D.C.C], we conclude that the statute 
simply provides that the validity of a joint 
account with a right of survivorship is not 
to be determined by the requirements for 
wills, and does not preclude consideration 
of joint bank accounts and certificates of 
deposit as transfers for purposes of the 
omitted spouse statute.1 
[3] Louis asserts that the trial court 
e*red in not granting his motion for sum-
mary judgment made during trial because 
"[t]he estate submitted no evidence at the 
hearing . . . but limited itself to cross ex-
amination of Louis " According to 
Louis, this incorrectly placed the burden 
upon him to show that Elsie did not provide 
for him by transfers outside the will. 
There are several problems with this argu-
nienL 
See Matter of Estate of Beaman, 119 Ariz. 614, 
617-618, 583 P.2d 270, 273-274 (ArizXtApp. 
1978); Ariz.Rev.StaLAnn. §§ 14-2301 and 14-
6106 (1975); Matter of Estate of Taggart, 95 
N.M. 117, 123-124, 619 P.2d 562, 568-569 (N.M. 
CLApp.1980); N.M.StaLAnn. §§ 45-2-301 and 
45-6-106 (1978); AnnoL, 11 A.L.R. 4th 1213 
(1982). 
STATE v. MATHISEN 
Cite as 356 N.WJ>d 129 (N.D. 1984) 
First, a motion for summary judgment J., of issuing 
must be served on the opposing party at 
least ten days prior to the time fixed for 
the hearing. Rule 56(c), N.D.R.Civ.P. An 
examination of the record reveals that no 
notice was given in this case. Cf. Temme 
v. Travel, 102 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1960). 
Second, the party who moves for summa-
ry judgment has the burden of showing 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Roll v. 
Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648 (N.D.1983). In this 
case, the parties had stipulated to the value 
of the property held in joint tenancy by 
Louis and Elsie, and this Court has held 
that the amount of the transfers alone may 
in some circumstances be sufficient for a 
trier of fact to find the intent that the 
transfers be in lieu of a testamentary pro-
vision. See Knudsen II, supra. Thus, re-
gardless of who had the burden of proof, 
the trial court would have been required to 
make a finding of fact regarding Elsie's 
intent as a matter of law based solely on 
the parties' stipulation which would have 
been improper in a summary judgment pro-
ceeding. See Knudsen If supra. The trial 
court did not err in refusing to grant Louis' 
motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 
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checks without sufficient 
funds and was held in contempt for failing 
to comply with conditions of prior judg-
ment The Supreme Court, Sand, J., held 
that: (1) statute under which defendant 
was convicted does not deny equal protec-
tion on the basis of wealth; (2) it was 
immaterial whether defendant had an erro-
neous innocent impression that there were 
sufficient funds on deposit; and (3) defend-
ant had made a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. 
Affirmed. 
Pederson, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in the result. 
1. Constitutional Law <3>213.1(1) 
False Pretenses <3>2, 22 
Statute prohibiting the issuing of a 
check without sufficient funds does not 
make an unconstitutional classification on 
the basis of wealth; statute merely per-
mits, but does not require, a notice of dis-
honor to be sent and does not make subse-
quent payment an affirmative defense. 
NDCC 6-08-16. 
ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE, PED-
ERSON and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur. 
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STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Bob MATHISEN, a.k.a. Robert Mathisen, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Cr. Nos. 987 and 995 to 1001. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
Oct 23, 1984. 
Defendant was convicted in the County 
Court, Stark County, Donald L. Jorgensen, 
2. Constitutional Law <s»211(3) 
Facially neutral statute may violate 
equal protection in its application or effect. 
3. Constitutional Law <s=250.1(3) 
Selective prosecution, if based upon im-
proper motives, can violate constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection but selec-
tive enforcement in and of itself is not a 
constitutional violation. 
4. Criminal Law ®=>37.10(1) 
To support a defense of selective pros-
ecution, defendant must establish that oth-
er individuals similarly situated have not 
generally been prosecuted and that the 
state's selection of him for prosecution is 
invidious or in bad faith. 
5. False Pretenses @=>6 
Defendant who had knowledge that 
payment on cashier's check which he had 
